Oil is part of everyday life, even when you don't think about it. It's refined into fuels that power cars, move goods, and help farmers grow our food. It's also used to make things like the clothes we wear.
Since the US and Israel went to war with Iran in February 2026, the world has been using more oil than it produces. Oil still passes through Hormuz and the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabia's bypass pipeline has restarted. But attacks and restrictions limit shipping, while Russian refinery strikes and export bans add to fuel shortages. Stored oil makes up the shortfall. The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level since 1982.
The Depletion Ledger tracks oil supplies, fuel prices, and effects on people and businesses. The charts show what's changed and how storage could change under three possible outcomes, with odds for each. We save the predictions so you can check them against what happens.
Last updated Oct 12, 2026
Brent
$104.72
Oct 9 settlement · up $0.44 on the December contract · thirteenth session close above $100 · +38% vs pre-crisis ~$76
US diesel (AAA)
$6.27
Oct 12 · two consecutive daily declines · +68% vs pre-war $3.72
US gasoline (AAA)
$4.36
Oct 12 · +55% vs Jan $2.81 (AAA)
SPR
283.0M
Oct 2 · down 0.8M in a week — second straight week at that pace · down 132.4M from pre-war 415.4M · lowest since Nov 1982
US diesel & heating oil
105.1M
Oct 2 · down 0.04M in a week — essentially flat · 13.5% below last year · East Coast stocks 28% below last year
These charts show how oil, gasoline, diesel, and natural gas prices have changed. Brent is a widely used benchmark for the price of crude oil. The gasoline and diesel charts use US national averages; the natural gas charts cover Europe and Asia. The captions explain where the readings come from. We leave gaps where data is missing.
EIA weekly and AAA daily national averages
The national average has risen from $2.81 in January to $4.36, an increase of about 55%. Prices peaked at $4.50 in May. Every month since March has averaged above the levels seen before the crisis.
AAA national average · dots on selected dates
Diesel cost $3.72 on Feb 27, just before the war. It reached a record $6.53 on Sep 22. It is now $6.27 on Oct 12, down two days in a row. That's still about 68% above its pre-war price. It first passed the previous record of about $5.85, set in June 2022, on Sep 4.
TTF, $/MMBtu. Filled dots: EIA weekly futures averages. Hollow dots: assessments and market quotes, including converted euro quotes. Sep 14 and Oct 9 use contracts for difference (CFDs), which track gas prices. Contracts and delivery periods differ; comparisons are approximate.
TTF tracks natural gas prices in Europe. JOGMEC's Oct 2 assessment was $24.60 for November delivery, about 120% above the pre-closure price. A converted market quote on Oct 9 was about $25.70. These readings cover different contracts, so the comparison is approximate. JOGMEC linked the higher prices to winter supply concerns and storage levels well below last year's.
By January 20, European gas storage had fallen to 48%, compared with a five-year average of 63%. With less gas in storage, Europe was buying liquefied natural gas (LNG) for immediate delivery during the season when the strait closed.
JKM, $/MMBtu. Filled dots: EIA weekly futures averages (Jan–Apr). Hollow dots: assessed spot prices and market quotes (May–Oct). Contracts and delivery periods differ, so comparisons are approximate.
JKM tracks the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered to Asia. It reached the high-$28s on Sep 10 — its highest level in roughly two and a half years — and was around $28.50 on Sep 11, according to JOGMEC. Its Oct 5 report put the Oct 2 price in the high-$24s, shown here as about $24.80 — down from the low-$25s on Sep 25, but still about 130% above the price before the closure. JOGMEC attributed the decline to subdued buying in East Asia and forecasts for a mild winter. Damaged production units at Qatar's Ras Laffan complex — about 17% of the country's LNG export capacity — are expected to be offline for 3–5 years, forcing Asian buyers to look elsewhere for supplies. With little gas in storage, the region has less to fall back on when supplies are disrupted or the weather increases demand.
Brent: selected observations and monthly averages. WTI: weekly FRED spot prices and recent futures closes.
Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) are crude oil price benchmarks. On Oct 9, Brent's December contract settled at $104.72 a barrel, up 0.4% from the Oct 8 close. WTI's November contract settled at $91.85, up 0.4%. The gray line shows WTI, which is also used in the fuel price spread chart beside this one.
The Brent line includes March's intraday peak and July's monthly average. Most WTI readings are weekly spot prices from the Federal Reserve's FRED database; recent ones use futures closing prices. The dots mark selected dates to keep nearby points legible; the fuel price gap calculation uses the full WTI series. Hollow dots mark rounded estimates from the sources.
Starting with Sep 23, the WTI line uses the November contract. It closed at $90.52 on Sep 22, about $4 below October's $94.59 — which is why the line steps down on Sep 23 even though the November contract itself rose. Brent switches from November to December on Oct 1. That change makes the line fall from Sep 30's $103.50 even though the December contract rose that day.
Retail fuel price minus WTI, dollars per barrel. EIA/AAA fuel prices; FRED and recent futures closes for WTI.
This chart subtracts the price of WTI crude oil from the retail price of fuel, both in dollars per barrel. The gap includes refining, transportation, and retailing costs. It helps explain why prices at the pump can keep rising even when crude gets cheaper. The diesel gap peaked at $181.8 a barrel on Sep 23 and had eased to $171.3 by Oct 12 — still about twice January's $89. The gasoline gap was $91.1 on Oct 12, up from about $59 in January. The gaps can narrow when crude prices rise faster than pump prices, as they did on Sep 10.
Readings with no same-day WTI price are paired with the nearest trading day's settlement, within 1–3 days; no missing prices are estimated. The EIA's official crack spread uses wholesale fuel prices, so these values differ.
When the world uses more oil than it produces, the difference comes out of storage. These charts show changes in stored oil, how stocks could rise or fall under different scenarios, and how much oil remains in the US emergency reserve.
Before the war, the world produced about 4 million more barrels of oil per day than it used. Since the war began, it has used stored oil to cover the shortfall in most months. The EIA estimates that stocks rose slightly in July. The IEA's latest report estimates a full-year supply loss of 5.7 million barrels per day, about 6% of the world's oil, and expects Middle East oil flows to remain below normal until 2027. The EIA estimates global production at 100.4 million barrels per day in August. The IEA estimates that more than 10 million barrels per day of Gulf production remained shut down. Saudi production alone fell by 2.3 million barrels per day that month, to 5.97 million.
The IEA has coordinated a release of 400 million barrels from 32 countries. Withdrawals from China's commercial stockpiles are estimated at about 2–3 million barrels a day, based on customs data, while its official reserve remains untouched. In its Sep 9 report, the EIA separately estimates that global commercial stocks have fallen about 400 million barrels this year; that figure and the IEA's estimate of 507 million barrels withdrawn since February cover different sets of stocks over different periods.
World production minus consumption, million barrels/day. EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), Table 3a, January–September 2026; forecasts aren't shown. Gulf production outages peaked at 11.2 million barrels/day in May; lower consumption and supply from elsewhere offset much of the loss. Separately, the IEA estimates that observed stocks fell by 507 million barrels since February, an average of 2.8 million barrels/day, including 95 million barrels in August.
EIA estimates that crude oil shipments through Hormuz fell from 15.9 million barrels a day in late 2025 to 3.7 million in April–June 2026. Refined fuel shipments fell too. Crude shipments through Bab el-Mandeb rose, while traffic through the Suez Canal and Egypt's SUMED pipeline stayed near its late-2025 level.
These April–June figures are from before the Red Sea closed in July. For more recent traffic, see Kpler's ship counts in the map caption at the top of the page.
Million barrels per day · Annual averages for 2023–24; quarterly averages from 2025
Sources: EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints (March 3, 2026) and Global Energy Security Data (August 12, 2026). Hollow dots mark EIA estimates: annual averages for 2023–24 and quarterly averages from 2025. Lines connect those averages. All three charts use the same scale. The 77% headline uses EIA's total for Hormuz, 21.6 to 4.9 million barrels a day; the two rounded components shown add to 4.8 in April–June. The figures cover global traffic, and a cargo can pass through more than one route. Ship tracking became less reliable around Hormuz in 2026, so those estimates may miss some traffic.
The UK Maritime Trade Operations centre (UKMTO), run by the Royal Navy, collects reports from merchant ships in the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. UKMTO recorded at least 2 attack reports in each complete week shown. Oil can keep moving through these routes while ships are still being attacked.
These are reported attacks, not a count of every attack. UKMTO says some strikes probably go unreported. Hijackings, advisories, and suspicious activity are recorded separately and aren't included here.
Source: UKMTO attack reports, Jul 1–Oct 12, 2026. Weeks run Monday–Sunday, by incident date. Lighter bars mark partial weeks; the latest week is still in progress.
This chart uses reports #78 through #165, as of Oct 12, 2026. UKMTO numbers reports for the year; 77 came before this chart's start, including three before the war began on February 28. We keep earlier entries as UKMTO's recent-incidents page moves forward. The 23 reports classified as hijackings, advisories, or suspicious activity aren't counted as attacks.
Reports #99, #100, and #125 are missing from the captured page. The Joint Maritime Information Center's August 4 update records Egyptian authorities identifying #99 and #100 as likely drone attacks. Those two reports aren't included in the bars, and #125 remains unaccounted for. Other unreported attacks may also be missing.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes the US, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Korea, Australia, and much of Western Europe. This chart shows crude oil and refined fuels stored on land by companies and governments in those member countries. These stocks help make up for interruptions in supply. China isn't an OECD member, so its stockpiles aren't included.
In May 2026, the latest month shown, stocks were at their lowest in the EIA data since January 2021. The shaded band shows the range for each calendar month from 2021 through 2025. Stocks fell below that range in April and May 2026.
Company and government oil stocks held on land. EIA international data, monthly, January 2021–May 2026, in million barrels. Shaded range: 2021–2025. The vertical line marks the start of the war on February 28, 2026.
The three lines show how oil in storage could change if shipping recovers, the standoff continues, or the corridor closes. For each scenario, we make assumptions about how much oil the world produces and uses.
Each line starts at zero in August 2026. Values below zero mean less oil in storage than in that month; values above zero mean more. Zero means no change, not empty storage.
The lines use our September 19 assumptions. They don't account for further cuts in oil use as stocks fall. You can read the assumptions and see how we check the predictions on the model page.
Select a comparison to see the EIA's October 6 outlook or what would happen if the June–August 2026 trend continued (−47.7 million barrels a month). Both use the same starting point as the scenarios.
Change since August 2026, in million barrels. We adjust production and consumption from the EIA's September 9 outlook for each scenario. The EIA comparison uses its October 6 outlook: a September estimate followed by forecasts from October. Recent trend repeats IEA-reported changes. The two agencies' figures cover different sets of oil stocks.
Our estimates, updated when events meet the rules on the model page.
The bars show our estimated chance of each outcome and how those estimates have changed. The colors match the three lines above. A higher percentage means we think that outcome is more likely. It doesn't tell you how accurate the storage projection will be.
The repaired Saudi bypass pipeline is carrying about 3.5M barrels a day, close to the 4M it carried before the drone strikes, and tanker loadings at Yanbu have resumed (Wall Street Journal, Sep 28). We moved the odds toward standoff based on that report, making an exception to our rule requiring official confirmation or an assessment that repairs would take only days.
Reuters reported that the bypass pipeline had restarted at a reduced rate, with the first cargo at Yanbu scheduled to load on Sep 22. We moved the odds back toward standoff on that report.
Oil loadings at Yanbu, the pipeline's export port, stopped while the pipeline remained shut. Oil could no longer leave through the Saudi bypass. In Libya, guards shut the Hamada–Zawiya pipeline, halting two oil fields.
The Saudi bypass pipeline was suspended, and the Houthis held the entire Red Sea coast. An official pipeline restart would return the odds to 10/50/40.
Tanker losses reached 10 per week, Brent passed $100, and Jazan was affected.
An area was closed to shipping, and a base in a third country was hit for the first time.
Vessel tracking showed 7% of normal crossings through Hormuz and did not support reports that 8.6M barrels a day were passing through.
Our first estimate: about a 65% chance that the conflict would ease.
Corridor holds
10%
Tankers can pass through Hormuz under an Iran–Oman agreement or with US escorts. Traffic gradually returns to normal over one to two quarters.
In this scenario, Brent moves toward $70–80.
Standoff
50%
Fighting continues at the current level. Tanker attacks and shipping restrictions continue, some Iranian facilities remain out of service, and the repaired Saudi bypass operates at a reduced rate. The strait stays partly open.
Brent stays in the $100–120 range. Oil stocks keep falling through 2027. We assume Gulf production stays at the same level.
Corridor lapses
40%
The shipping route closes for a prolonged period or the fighting gets worse. More tankers are lost, shipping restrictions remain, and the bypass, Abqaiq, and Jazan stay out of service for months.
Brent rises above $130. Shortages spread from the US East Coast to Russia, Europe, China, and aviation fuel.
We use judgment to assign these odds and set rules in advance for changing them. A pipeline restarting or a shipping agreement breaking down could prompt a change; a quiet week alone wouldn't. You can read the rules and see what we're watching on the model page.
These stocks exclude the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). They stood at 424.1 million barrels on Oct 2, up from 404.5 million on Jul 24. The EIA's Oct 7 report shows stocks fell by 3.2 million barrels, the first weekly decline after two increases. Crude imports rose by 1.1 million barrels a day that week, to 6.8 million a day. Stocks were 3.9 million barrels above the same week last year. SPR releases have helped supply commercial oil users this year. Moving oil from the reserve to commercial storage leaves the combined amount unchanged.
EIA weekly stocks, excluding the SPR, in million barrels. The Jul 24 low was 22.2M below the same week in 2025.
EIA weekly ending stocks, million bbl
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is the US government's emergency supply of crude oil. It was created after the energy shortages of the 1970s. The reserve held 415.4 million barrels when the war began. The latest report, for the week ending Oct 2, puts it at 283.0 million, down 0.8 million barrels — the second straight week at that pace. Weekly withdrawals had fallen from 3.1 million barrels in the week ending Aug 28 to 1.2 million the following week, 0.4 million in each of the next two weeks, and about 0.8 million in each of the last two weeks. For comparison, the reserve peaked at 727 million barrels in December 2009 and stood at 270.5 million in August 1982. The releases help make up for supplies that can't leave the Gulf.
The Department of Energy releases oil from the SPR through contracts and scheduled deliveries. A supply shortage doesn't automatically trigger withdrawals. On Sep 29, DOE offered companies loans of up to 40 million barrels, with bids due Oct 6 and deliveries under awarded contracts scheduled for November and December. As of Oct 9, no award has been announced, so withdrawals could pause as earlier deliveries end. Withdrawals averaged about 112,000 barrels a day in the latest reported week. The pace can change with each release decision.
The red lines mark the model's reserve thresholds, or floors. At about 300M barrels, some caverns risk damage and can't safely be refilled after a withdrawal. The first report below that threshold was for the week ending Aug 7, at 298.7 million barrels. The other floors are 250M, the GEF minimum for sustained withdrawals; 180M, the hard operating limit; and 70M, the Department of Energy's stated safe minimum.
Crude oil has to be refined before it can be used as diesel, gasoline, or jet fuel. That makes refinery capacity just as important as the amount of oil available. US refineries are processing more oil than last year, while processing has fallen elsewhere and strikes continue to damage Russian refineries. The IEA describes the global refining system as “stretched to the limit.” Atlantic Basin refining margins reached records in August, led by diesel.
Straight-run (distillation) yield, % of barrel volume
Crude oil comes in different forms, and they don’t all produce the same mix of fuels or need the same processing. Replacement oil has to suit the refinery's equipment. Heavier crude needs extra processing, which consumes energy and, in some steps, hydrogen. Lighter crude can overwhelm equipment that handles its lighter components while leaving other units underused. The refinery may have to cut output or pay for modifications. Lower output spreads fixed costs over fewer barrels, raising the cost per barrel.
These examples compare US shale, Gulf crude, and heavy sour crude (diluted bitumen) using three of the 42 lab reports, called assays, in ExxonMobil's public library. It's a small sample, chosen for availability and contrast. The bars show straight-run yields: the parts separated by heating the oil, before further processing into finished fuels. The parts used for diesel and jet fuel make up 39.2% of WTI Light – Export, 34.9% of Upper Zakum, and 18.1% of Kearl.
The heavier parts need more equipment. Most complex refineries can process vacuum gas oil, but the heaviest residue needs specialized equipment, such as a coker, to break it down. Residue makes up 31.4% of Kearl, compared with 16.5% of Upper Zakum and 4.1% of WTI. That helps explain why heavy crude from Canada or Venezuela can't quickly replace missing Gulf supplies. The next chart shows how much of each type the world produced before the war; the diesel price gap chart shows how fuel prices have diverged from crude prices.
WTI Light – Export · Light sweet (US shale), 47.4° API, 0.07% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 39.2%
butane and lighter 3.0% (gases)
Upper Zakum · Medium sour (Gulf), 33.4° API, 2.09% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 34.9%
butane and lighter 3.1% (gases)
Kearl Blend · Heavy sour (diluted bitumen), 19.8° API, 3.83% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 18.1%
butane and lighter 1.4% (gases)
First-stage yields by volume, not finished fuel output. Upper Zakum stands in for Arab Light; Kearl stands in for Venezuela's Merey; no public assays of Arab Light or Merey are in that library. These are examples, not averages for their classes. Naphtha combines light and heavy naphtha; vacuum gas oil (VGO) is the 350–550 °C portion; residue is what remains above 550 °C. Assays: WTI Light – Export, WTLEX26Y, Feb 27, 2026; Upper Zakum, UPZAK26B, Jan 23, 2026; Kearl Blend, KEARL23B, Oct 26, 2023. Dates as printed in the reports. Source: ExxonMobil's crude oil assay library. Processing requirements: EIA. Lighter-crude constraints: EIA's study of processing light shale oil.
million barrels per day · world, annual
A refinery's equipment is built around the oil it expects to process. For a plant designed for medium-sour crude — oil with a medium density and high sulfur content — switching supplies changes the work that equipment has to do. Lighter oil can leave some units underused; heavier oil leaves more residue to break down. Major changes take years: ExxonMobil's Beaumont expansion began construction in 2019 and started operating in 2023.
The chart below shows how the world's supply of different types of crude changed before the war. Medium-sour crude accounted for 32.8% of production in 2024. Its share had been falling while light, sweet crude grew from 18.7% in 2010 to 23.0% in 2024. Refiners had invested in equipment for heavier oil before the shale boom, so the growing supply of lighter crude doesn't suit every plant equally well.
The war has cut supplies of the medium-sour oil those plants were built to use. The IEA's September report put lost Gulf production at more than 10 million barrels a day (August 2026). Several of the Gulf's main export grades sit in this chart's medium-sour band (26–35° API): Arab Light (32.8°), Arab Medium (30.2°) and Basrah Medium (27.9°, Iraq's largest export grade since 2021). The IEA does not break the shut-in down by grade, so how the loss splits across the bands is not known. The production data ends in 2024; the annotation above the 2024 column shows the loss reported in 2026, across all grades.
World crude production, million barrels per day. Eni's ten quality classes are grouped into five; “other grades” combines six classes and unassigned production (0.7% in 2024). Reported years: 2010, 2015 and 2019–2024. Source: Eni, World Energy Review 2025 (21 Oct 2025), using IEA data; table on printed p96, definitions on p9 (PDF pages 98 and 11). Annotation: IEA Oil Market Report, 11 Sep 2026 (August 2026 data); it marks the total loss, not a single grade. Gulf export-grade properties:Wikipedia(Arab Light, Arab Medium) andPetro-Logistics(Basrah Medium, 27.9° API / 3.0% S, Iraq's main export grade since 2021; Basrah Light export stopped in Jan 2022). Gulf losses also include lighter grades such as Murban and heavier grades such as Arab and Basrah heavy. Refinery configuration: IEA and EIA. Beaumont construction timeline: ExxonMobil.
In June 2026, total refinery output in OECD countries was about 1% lower than in June 2025. Gasoline and diesel output fell. Jet fuel and other kerosene rose. The comparison doesn't tell us how much of the change was caused by the war.
Estimated million barrels per day · June 2026, change vs June 2025
Oil coming in
After refining
Products coming out
Share of available refinery capacity in use, weekly.
US refineries operated above 95% of their available capacity every week from Jun 5 through Sep 11, reaching 98.0% in the week ending Aug 28. In the week ending Oct 2, they used 92.7% of their capacity and processed 223,000 more barrels a day than the week before. For the January–October weeks shown, refineries used an average of 90.8% of their capacity in 2025 and 93.6% in 2026. Fuel exports also reached a record 8 million barrels per day in August, according to OPEC. US plants are working close to capacity, but shortages in Europe, Asia, and Russia continue to put pressure on fuel supplies.
EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report (WPULEUS3), weeks ending Friday. Utilization is the amount processed divided by available capacity. Both lines cover the same Jan–Oct period. Monthly crude inputs to refineries ran 15.9–17.4 million barrels/day in the January–September months (STEO Table 4a, Oct 6 release), above 2025 in every month. The fuel price gap chart in Prices shows how fuel and crude prices compare.
Refineries elsewhere are processing less oil. These figures from the IEA's August and September reports show the size of the decline.
Global refining, August
81.4 mb/d
summer peak, −4.2 mb/d below a year ago (OMR, Sep 11)
Refining forecast, 2026
−2.6 mb/d
IEA forecast vs 2025 (OMR, Sep 11)
Q3 forecast revision
−370 kb/d
Reduction in the Q3 refining forecast (OMR, Aug 12)
Strikes on Russian refineries are reducing the amount of fuel available to other countries. The line connects reported estimates: about 75% of capacity remaining by mid-April, about 70% by Aug 29 (Moscow Times), and about 49% by Oct 4 (Ukraine's Defense Ministry). The red bar shows how much the estimates differ. The Defense Ministry says 51% was struck (Oct 4), Russian Forbes puts lost capacity at 54% (Sep 9), and the IEA estimates more than 20%. You can compare these figures with the outages and export restrictions below. The Defense Ministry's claim hasn't been independently verified.
Estimated capacity remaining, as a share of capacity before the strikes
Capacity out of service
51%
UA Defense Ministry, Oct 4 (Khmara) — up from >45% (Sep 21) and ~30% (Aug 29, Moscow Times)
Russian Forbes: 54% (Sep 9) · IEA: more than 20% · Dallas Fed: as much as 60% over summer 2026 · Kpler: refineries operating at 60% of capacity (Oct 10, FT); estimates vary month to month · the 51% claim can't be independently verified (AP)
Refineries struck, Sep 20–Oct 9
10 plants
Moscow refinery (Sep 20) · Kuibyshev, near Samara (Sep 21–22) · Ufa (Sep 21–22) · Perm, ~257 kb/d (Sep 25) · Novoshakhtinsk, ~110–140 kb/d (Sep 25) · Ilsky, ~125 kb/d — three killed (Sep 26) · Lukoil-Volgograd (Oct 2) · Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat, one of Russia's largest (Oct 8) · Omsk, Russia's largest, ~440 kb/d — second hit (Oct 8) · Lukoil Ukhta, Komi (Oct 9)
Volgograd stopped all crude processing after the Oct 2 strike (Reuters, Oct 6); the Ufa, Salavat, Omsk, and Ukhta halts are still unverified (Omsk: Oct 8 strike, the second hit on the plant since the Jul 6 strike — the General Staff says the ELOU-AVT-11 primary unit was damaged in the July strike, and an October halt is unconfirmed; Ukhta: Oct 9 strike, local reports, with regional authorities denying damage). The other five plants have confirmed shutdowns, with no restarts reported. Samara and Novorossiysk terminals were also hit. A reported drone strike set the Yug Rusi terminal at Rostov-on-Don on fire overnight Oct 9–10 — its second strike since Jul 9. This is the Novoshakhtinsk refinery’s loading terminal, not the refinery itself. A railway bridge was damaged; two ships at Azov were reportedly hit, an unverified claim (Kyiv Independent; UNIAN via Ukraine Today, Oct 10). All three export routes have come under attack (Reuters, ISW, Gen Staff)
Major refineries still offline
both out
Kirishi, Russia's second-largest, ~404 kb/d, halted since early September (UA.NEWS, Sep 2) · Ryazan, Moscow's main supplier, ~344 kb/d, offline since Sep 6 (Reuters, Sep 10)
Nameplate capacity, not measured lost output.
Gasoline shortages at gas stations
45–53%
Share of stations without AI-92 (45%) or AI-95 (53%) gasoline, mid-September (gdebenzin, via UNN, Sep 22); rationing has returned in about two-thirds of regions (Independent, Sep 22)
Gasoline prices +21% YTD (Moscow Times, Sep 14) · IEA: diesel output down about 30%, with waits of up to 40 hours (Oct 5)
Jet fuel now imported
military + civilian
Russia is importing Jet A-1 from South Korea and Egypt (UA military intelligence, Aug 29); no jet fuel or gasoline has left Russia by sea for two straight weeks (S&P Global CAS, Oct 1)
ISW (Sep 26): Geran drones use jet fuel; a kerosene shortage would limit their use
Russia's export restrictions leave less fuel available to other countries during the heating season. On Sep 30, Russia extended its diesel export ban for producers through Oct 31 (government decree; Moscow Times, Reuters); on Oct 10, Moscow said the ban was partially lifted with immediate effect. Novak said deliveries could rise from 300,000 tons in October to 1M in December, potentially reaching 3M tons a month later (Interfax, Oct 12). The jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, ends on Nov 30. Damaged refineries also leave Russia with less fuel for its own gas stations and military as winter approaches.
Oct 31, 2026
diesel exports by producers — extended through Oct 31 by government decree (Sep 30; Moscow Times, Reuters). The US Treasury’s Oct 9 license permits transactions in Russian diesel under US sanctions; it doesn’t lift Russia’s ban. On Oct 10, the government said it had partially lifted the ban with immediate effect, ahead of the deadline; Novak’s schedule is 300,000 tons in October, 500,000 in November, 1M in December, potentially 3M a month (Interfax, Oct 12). See “What to watch next” for the announced delivery schedule.
Nov 30, 2026
jet fuel exports
Jan 31, 2027
gasoline exports and diesel exports by non-producers
Russian diesel and gasoil shipments out of Black Sea ports fell to zero in the week to Sep 24 — the first time on record (S&P Global Commodities at Sea, Oct 1); a year ago those ports sent out around 200,000 tonnes a week. S&P also reported no seaborne jet-fuel or gasoline exports for two straight weeks.
Imports aren't making up the difference, even with fuel shipments on the Belarus rail route at 25 times last year's volume. The shortage also affects Kyrgyzstan, which imports more than 90% of its gasoline from Russia and has about six weeks of reserves left.
On Oct 1, Putin called a proposed trade — halting attacks on ships in the Black Sea in exchange for halting strikes on refineries — "absurd," and estimated the strikes had cost Russia about 1% of GDP. In the US, President Trump has blamed the refinery strikes for the diesel-price surge: "This isn't really a Middle Eastern problem; this is more of a Russia problem" (Fox News, Sep 27).
Higher energy costs affect more than your fuel bill. They can slow business activity, keep inflation high, and eventually make food more expensive. People and businesses also use less oil when they can no longer afford it. Economists call this demand destruction. Below, you can compare oil use with last year's levels and see the latest recession estimates, interest rates, and possible effects on food prices.
World oil and other liquid fuel use, million barrels/day. EIA STEO, Oct 6 release; January–September, 2026 vs 2025.
World oil use fell 4.7 million barrels per day below last year's level in May, a decline of about 5%. The gap narrowed to 3.9 million in July and 1.1 million in August, then widened slightly to 1.8 million in September. Using less oil helps contain prices, but it also reflects the strain on the economy.
The IEA now expects demand to fall by 2.5 million barrels per day across 2026, compared with its August estimate of 1.6 million. It expects the quarterly decline to ease from 5.3 million in Q2 to 3.4 million in Q3 and 2.0 million in Q4, followed by a 2.6 million barrel per day recovery in 2027. The losses are concentrated in fuels such as diesel and in raw materials used to make chemicals, especially in Asia. OPEC expects a different result: demand growth of 0.4 million barrels per day in 2026. That's a difference of 2.9 million between the two forecasts.
EIA STEO Table 3e, Oct 6 2026; forecast completed Oct 1. The release lists Jan–Sep as historical data, though world and regional consumption figures are estimates. They include fuel used by refineries and ships. Forecasts from Oct 2026 onward aren't shown.
Million b/d, July 2026 vs July 2025 — same table.
World
−3.9
105.6 → 101.8 mb/d
Middle East
−1.3
10.2 → 8.9 mb/d
Asia & Oceania
−1.9
37.9 → 36.0 mb/d
China
−0.8
16.4 → 15.6 mb/d · part of Asia & Oceania; using stockpiles to support consumption
Europe
−0.1
14.8 → 14.7 mb/d
United States
−0.6
21.2 → 20.6 mb/d
These estimates, published between June and September 2026, put the chance of a US recession over the next 12 months at 15% to 50%. Goldman Sachs has kept its estimate at 15% since Jun 26, down from 30% in late March. It repeated that estimate on Sep 14. Polymarket puts the odds at 32%, but covers a longer period, through the end of 2027. Keep that difference in mind when comparing the figures.
The Federal Reserve can cut interest rates to help a slowing economy, but inflation makes that harder when prices are still rising too quickly. August producer prices rose 5.4% from a year earlier. Consumer inflation held at 3.4%, with energy up 16.3%, while core inflation eased to 2.4%.
On Sep 16, the Fed voted 12-to-0 to raise rates by a quarter of a percentage point, citing elevated inflation. According to the Wall Street Journal, 16 of the 18 officials projected at least one more increase this year. Higher borrowing costs add to the pressure from rising energy prices.
Fed's target rate, Sep 16
3.75–4.00%
Up 0.25 percentage points in a 12-to-0 vote · statement: 'Inflation remains elevated. … The Committee will deliver price stability.'
Odds of a rate increase, Oct 27–28
60%
Our estimate, published Sep 16 · 16 of 18 Fed officials projected another increase this year · we'll check this prediction after the October decision
August producer prices (BLS, Sep 10)
5.4% YoY
+0.4% for the month · July revised to 4.8% annually · energy +4.2%, diesel +24.1% annually · 10-year yield 5.311% on Oct 5, its highest close of the war
The European Central Bank says Germany and Italy could both be in a technical recession by the end of 2026 if the conflict continues.
Borrowing costs and everyday prices are both at multi-year highs. In its Sep 16 rate decision, the Fed said inflation remained high and the economy was growing at a solid pace.
10-year US Treasury yield, % · chart through Oct 9 · weekly closes (FRED) · Sep 11, Sep 14–18, Sep 21–25, Sep 28–30, Oct 1–2, Oct 5–9: Yahoo closing values.
The 10-year Treasury yield is the rate the US government pays to borrow for a decade. It also influences mortgage and business loan rates. It has risen by about one percentage point, or 100 basis points, since before the war. Inflation and concerns about government debt are both putting pressure on rates. The national debt exceeds $40 trillion, and $8.4 trillion of Treasuries must be refinanced by year-end.
The 10-year yield closed at 5.244% on Oct 9, its thirteenth straight close above 5% — still below the war's high close of 5.311% on Oct 5. On Oct 2, the G7 reserve-release announcement and a weak September jobs report (29,000 jobs, with unemployment rising) cut expectations of another Fed hike. According to the Wall Street Journal (Oct 1), the yield reached its highest level in 24 years this week. Its quarterly increase was the largest since 1994, helping push US mortgage rates above 7%. A preliminary business survey showed activity growing at its fastest pace in over four years, increasing expectations that the Fed would raise rates again. Its Sep 16 close of 5.006% was the first above 5% since the war began.
The 2-year yield was 4.63% on Sep 11, its highest since July 2024. The market's measure of expected inflation over the next 10 years eased to 2.36%. That suggests investors are seeking higher returns after inflation, even as their inflation expectations have fallen.
CPI (retail, amber) + PPI final demand (wholesale, blue) · % year-over-year · monthly (BLS) · Jan – Aug.
Consumer inflation rose from about 2.4% to 4.2% in three months as fuel became more expensive. It eased to 3.4% in July and stayed there in August. Prices rose 0.4% in August alone, with gasoline's 3.9% increase accounting for more than a third of that rise. The annual rate of core inflation, which excludes food and energy, eased from 2.5% to 2.4%, although its 0.3% monthly increase was above expectations. Producer prices rose faster, peaking at 5.9% in May and increasing 5.4% in August compared with a year earlier. July's reading was revised to 4.8%. Energy explains much of the increase, with diesel up 24.1%. Businesses can face these higher costs before consumers see them in prices (BLS, Sep 10–11).
Natural gas is used to make ammonia, a key ingredient in nitrogen fertilizer. Higher gas and shipping costs can make food more expensive, but the effects may take more than a year to reach your grocery bill.
The timeline uses delays seen after energy prices rose in 2007–08 and 2022 to show when food prices could rise. It's a rough comparison with those periods, not a forecast from this model.
Gulf–India tanker shipping costs
+411%
$4.34/bbl in Aug vs pre-war (Frontline)
TTF gas (Europe)
$24.6/MMBtu
JOGMEC assessed Oct 2 (published Oct 5) · up from $24.1 on Sep 25
JKM gas (Asia)
≈$24.8/MMBtu
JOGMEC assessed Oct 2 (published Oct 5) · high-$24s, down from low-$25s on Sep 25
Higher energy prices can raise freight and fertilizer costs, affect planting and harvests, and eventually raise food prices. The bars show approximate periods based on the 2007–08 and 2022 price increases. The effects on food prices can take more than a year to appear.
Upcoming reports and decisions that could change the outlook.
Any day
Whether Saudi oil supplies keep moving. At the WPC energy congress on Oct 12, the Saudi energy minister said the East–West pipeline had recovered to about 5.8M barrels a day by Oct 6 — over 80% of its capacity — after the September attacks, and that Saudi Arabia is looking to expand pipeline capacity to 10M barrels a day within two to three years (Bloomberg, Reuters). US Energy Secretary Wright put Gulf flows at 80–90% of pre-war levels, up to 14M barrels a day through Hormuz (The National, Oct 12). Kpler estimated September shipments through the strait at just under 9M barrels a day. These estimates cover different periods; Wright’s broader Gulf recovery figure also includes bypass routes. Reports and satellite fire imagery point to a possible strike at the Shedgum gas plant serving Ghawar, but damage and lost production remain unconfirmed.
The bypass avoids Hormuz. Watch for confirmed damage at Shedgum/Ghawar, lost output, and whether tanker loadings keep up with pipeline flows.
Any day
Whether the US and Iran agree on reopening the strait. Indirect talks continue through Qatar. Vance says any agreement requires a “meaningful” reduction in Iran’s enrichment capacity (Reuters, Oct 6). On Oct 8, under “Operation Economic Outcast,” Treasury designated 17 shadow-fleet vessels and State designated five more vessels, 10 entities, and 6 individuals — 22 vessels in all (OFAC; State). Trump said on Oct 8 that the US wouldn’t strike before the midterms, but might afterward (CBS, TIME). His Oct 9 claim of “total control” of Hormuz isn’t a verified shipping assessment.
Watch for a signed deal, a change in the blockade, or renewed strikes. Any could change how much oil gets through.
Any day
Whether the Yemen offensive changes Red Sea shipping. The Saudi-led coalition claims it destroyed 136 Houthi targets and cleared Bab al-Mandeb; the Houthis deny losing ground. The claims remain unverified. Riyadh’s King Khalid airport was attacked again on Oct 11 — a Pakistani was killed and 11 people were injured (AP) — a day after a strike that killed 13 and wounded more than 300. It has been hit four times in five days and remains closed. Dammam’s King Fahd airport was also attacked (Saudi aviation authorities). The Houthis said Sanaa airport was struck, blaming the coalition, and heavy fighting has continued around Taiz, their main offensive objective. The Houthi-run health ministry said coalition strikes killed 91 people over five weeks, 60% of them women and children; the claim remains unverified (AP). Trump says the US “may” join Saudi strikes on the Houthis (CBS, Oct 10); no decision as of Oct 12.
Watch whether the US joins the strikes or shipping routes become safer. A confirmed Houthi attack on non-Saudi shipping could send container traffic back around Africa.
Any day
Whether oil keeps moving through Hormuz despite attacks. Ships are still transiting — Kpler’s three-day average stood at 12 a day (Oct 5–7); its provisional 30-day average through Oct 12 was about 22 vessels a day, roughly two-thirds tankers, and September crude through the strait ran just under 9M barrels a day — the highest month since the war began, but about 44% of February (The National, Oct 12). On Oct 11, the Valthera caught fire after a projectile strike in the strait; its Indian crew were safe. A drone struck the Petro Dolphin off Sohar, Oman: nine Indian crew were rescued and two remain missing, the search still under way as of Oct 12 (UKMTO; India’s shipping ministry). Windward identified 12 vessels from 16 Gulf attacks over ten days, all using the US-assisted southern route with tracking systems off. Oil companies are reportedly paying up to $50 million per transit to reach offshore areas where crude is transferred between ships (Windward, Oct 8).
Watch the search for the missing crew, vessel damage, and whether ships keep passing safely. Regional export figures include routes outside Hormuz; they don’t show that the strait has returned to normal.
Any day
Whether the Russian diesel deal turns into deliveries. On Saturday, Russia said it had partially lifted its diesel export ban with immediate effect; Novak’s schedule is 300,000 tons this month, 500,000 in November, 1M in December, and potentially 3M a month (Interfax, Oct 12). US Treasury license 135 permits transactions under US sanctions; the Minerva Zen, reported as the first diesel cargo, was carrying liquid fertilizer (TankerTrackers). On the energy ceasefire Trump announced Oct 11, Zelensky said on Oct 12 that Russia had already violated it — a Russian jet-powered drone hit a Ukrainian gas facility in the night, while “Russian oil refineries were not burning” last night (CNN). Seven senators, four of them Republicans, asked the administration to reverse the diesel deal, which they say contradicts the 2022 import ban (CNN, Oct 11).
Watch for diesel deliveries, a Russian decree, and a reciprocal halt to energy strikes. A halt could help refineries recover; it wouldn’t immediately restore lost output. Analysts expect little effect on US diesel prices (Reuters, Oct 11).
Oct 14
The next weekly EIA report is due Oct 14 at 10:30 a.m. Eastern, covering the week ending Oct 9. The previous report put SPR stocks at 283.0M barrels and diesel and heating-oil stocks at 105.1M, 13.5% below last year. No award for DOE’s sixth SPR offering has been announced as of Oct 9.
Watch whether SPR withdrawals continue at about 112,000 barrels a day and whether fuel stocks fall further. Deliveries from the sixth offering are scheduled for November–December if awarded.
Oct 14
The BLS September CPI report is due Oct 14. August producer prices were already up 5.4% year-over-year (BLS, Sep 10).
Watch whether energy is pushing headline inflation higher; it sets up the Fed’s Oct 27–28 meeting.
Oct 14
The IEA’s monthly Oil Market Report is due Oct 14. Its demand and supply assessments feed the model’s monthly inputs — the latest edition (Sep 11) forecasts 2026 global demand down 2.5M barrels a day versus 2025.
Watch whether the agency expects oil use and production to recover.
These estimates show where shortages could worsen if the crisis continues. The dates are based on published stock levels, customs data, and export-ban schedules. The timing could be a week or two earlier or later.
Each weekly EIA report (next: Oct 14)
US East Coast — US diesel and heating-oil stocks stood at 105.1M barrels in the week ending Oct 2, roughly flat on the week and 13.5% below last year. At the four-week average rate of 3.8M barrels a day, those stocks are equivalent to about 28 days of use. East Coast stocks are 28% below last year.
Oct 31
Russia — Russia’s diesel export ban for producers runs through Oct 31 (Interfax, Sep 30). Trump announced a diesel supply deal on Oct 9, and the US Treasury permitted transactions under General License 135. That US permission doesn’t lift Russia’s ban. On Oct 10, Russia said it had partially lifted the ban with immediate effect; Novak’s schedule runs from 300,000 tons this month to 1M in December, potentially reaching 3M tons a month later (Interfax, Oct 12). With more than 30% of refining capacity damaged, Russia may have little fuel available to export.
≈ mid-October
China — Commercial oil stocks could begin to fall faster than normal.
≈ late October
Europe's oil hubs — Rotterdam-area diesel stocks could fall below 8.5–9M barrels, making it harder for traders to find supplies. If the strait closes fully, this could happen by mid-October.
≈ late October
Europe, at the pump — Consumers could face fuel shortages and higher prices, increasing pressure on governments to respond.
Nov 10–30
Air travel — Russia's jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, is due to end Nov 30. An extension would keep those export restrictions in place.