Oil is part of everyday life, even when you don't think about it. It's refined into fuels that power cars, move goods, and help farmers grow our food. It's also used to make things like the clothes we wear.
The war with Iran disrupted oil production and shipping. Gulf exports have since recovered despite continued attacks, but moving oil remains expensive. The International Energy Agency reported declining inventories through September. Russian refinery strikes and export bans add to fuel shortages, and the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level since 1982.
The Depletion Ledger tracks oil supplies, fuel prices, and effects on people and businesses. The charts distinguish reported data from estimates and agency forecasts, with sources and dates so you can follow what's changing.
Last updated Oct 27, 2026
Brent
$115.81
Oct 26 settlement · December contract · down $0.91 · 24th close above $100
US diesel (AAA)
$6.35
Oct 27 · five straight rises from the Oct 22 low $6.3090 · +71% vs pre-war $3.72
US gasoline (AAA)
$4.27
Oct 27 · +52% vs Jan $2.81 (AAA)
SPR
282.7M
Oct 16 · down 0.3M on the week · down 132.7M from pre-war 415.4M · lowest since Nov 1982
US diesel & heating oil
104.3M
Oct 16 · up 1.7M in a week · 9.7% below last year · East Coast stocks 22% below last year
These charts show how oil, gasoline, diesel, and natural gas prices have changed. Brent is a widely used benchmark for the price of crude oil. The gasoline and diesel charts use US national averages; the natural gas charts cover Europe and Asia. The captions explain where the readings come from. We leave gaps where data is missing.
EIA weekly and AAA daily national averages
The national average has risen from $2.81 in January to $4.27, an increase of about 52%. Prices peaked at $4.50 in May. Every month since March has averaged above the levels seen before the crisis.
AAA national average · dots on selected dates
Diesel cost $3.72 on Feb 27, just before the war. It reached a record $6.53 on Sep 22. It is now $6.35 on Oct 27, up from the day before. That's still about 71% above its pre-war price. It first passed the previous record of about $5.85, set in June 2022, on Sep 4.
TTF, $/MMBtu. Filled dots: EIA weekly futures averages. Hollow dots: assessments and market quotes, including converted euro quotes. Sep 14 uses a contract for difference (CFD), which tracks gas prices. Contracts and delivery periods differ; comparisons are approximate.
TTF tracks natural gas prices in Europe. JOGMEC's assessment for Oct 16, published Oct 19, was $28.90 for November delivery, up from $26.70 on Oct 9 and about 160% above the pre-closure price. JOGMEC linked the higher prices to tight spot LNG supply, reduced Norwegian gas supply, colder European weather, and Strait of Hormuz supply concerns.
By January 20, European gas storage had fallen to 48%, compared with a five-year average of 63%. With less gas in storage, Europe was buying liquefied natural gas (LNG) for immediate delivery during the season when the strait closed.
JKM, $/MMBtu. Filled dots: EIA weekly futures averages (Jan–Apr). Hollow dots: assessed spot prices and market quotes (May–Oct). Contracts and delivery periods differ, so comparisons are approximate.
JKM tracks the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered to Asia. JOGMEC’s Oct 19 report put the Oct 16 price in the high-$29s, shown here as about $29.80, up from the low-$26s on Oct 9 and about 180% above the pre-closure price. The delivery month has rolled to December, and JOGMEC reported more spot buying by South Korea and Thailand amid Middle East supply risks. Damaged units at Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex represent about 17% of the country’s LNG export capacity and are expected to remain offline for 3–5 years. Low inventories leave buyers with less to fall back on when supplies are disrupted.
Brent: selected observations and monthly averages. WTI: weekly FRED spot prices and recent futures closes.
On Oct 26, Brent settled at $115.81, down $0.91, and December WTI at $101.76, down $1.51. Bloomberg linked the decline to renewed diplomacy in Tehran.
Brent combines selected observations and monthly averages; gray WTI combines weekly spot prices with recent futures closes. Hollow dots mark rounded estimates. Contract changes affect comparisons on Sep 23 (WTI), Oct 1 (Brent) and Oct 20 (WTI). The Oct 20 step down combined a switch to the cheaper December contract with a price decline; it wasn't a single-contract move.
Retail fuel price minus WTI, dollars per barrel. EIA/AAA fuel prices; FRED and recent futures closes for WTI.
This chart subtracts the price of WTI crude oil from the retail price of fuel, both in dollars per barrel. The gap includes refining, transportation, and retailing costs. It helps explain why prices at the pump can keep rising even when crude gets cheaper. The diesel gap peaked at $181.8 a barrel on Sep 23 and had eased to $165.0 by Oct 27 — still nearly twice January's $89. The gasoline gap was $77.4 on Oct 27, up from about $59 in January. The gaps can narrow when crude prices rise faster than pump prices, as they did on Sep 10.
The switch to a cheaper WTI contract on Oct 20 mechanically widens these gaps. Readings without a same-day WTI price use the nearest trading day’s price within 1–3 days; missing prices aren’t estimated. The EIA's official crack spread uses wholesale fuel prices, so these values differ.
When the world uses more oil than it produces, the difference comes out of storage. These charts show the reported record of changes in stored oil since the war began and how much oil remains in the US emergency reserve.
Before the war, the world produced about 4 million more barrels of oil per day than it used. Since the war began, it has used stored oil to cover the shortfall in most months. The EIA estimates that stocks rose slightly in July. The IEA's October 14 report estimates a full-year supply loss of 5.8 million barrels per day, about 6% of the world's oil. It expects Middle East oil flows to remain below normal until 2027, though later shipping reports show a recovery.
The IEA has coordinated a release of 400 million barrels from 32 countries. Its reported inventory decline of 509 million barrels from the end of February through September includes stocks held by companies, governments, and ships. That inventory change is separate from the announced release program.
World production minus consumption, million barrels/day. EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), Table 3a, January–September 2026; forecasts aren't shown. Gulf production outages peaked at 11.2 million barrels/day in May; lower consumption and supply from elsewhere offset much of the loss. Separately, the IEA’s October 14 report estimates that observed stocks fell by 509 million barrels from the end of February through September, an average of 2.4 million barrels/day. September’s decline was 10 million barrels: stocks on land fell by 113 million, partly offset by a 103 million barrel increase in oil on water.
EIA estimates that crude oil shipments through Hormuz fell from 15.9 million barrels a day in late 2025 to 3.7 million in April–June 2026. Refined fuel shipments fell too. Crude shipments through Bab el-Mandeb rose, while traffic through the Suez Canal and Egypt's SUMED pipeline stayed near its late-2025 level.
These April–June figures are from before the Red Sea closed in July. For more recent traffic, see the Kpler 7-day averages labeled on the map at the top of the page.
Million barrels per day · Annual averages for 2023–24; quarterly averages from 2025
Sources: EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints (March 3, 2026) and Global Energy Security Data (August 12, 2026). Hollow dots mark EIA estimates: annual averages for 2023–24 and quarterly averages from 2025. Lines connect those averages. All three charts use the same scale. The 77% headline uses EIA's total for Hormuz, 21.6 to 4.9 million barrels a day; the two rounded components shown add to 4.8 in April–June. The figures cover global traffic, and a cargo can pass through more than one route. Ship tracking became less reliable around Hormuz in 2026, so those estimates may miss some traffic.
Kpler's map figures cover crude and other oil-related cargoes, excluding LNG, NGLs and Iranian-origin strait transits. Verified movements without tracking signals can be included. The pre-war baselines use March 2025–February 2026 averages with the same definitions. They differ from the EIA's periods and coverage, so the percentages aren't directly comparable. Kpler says recent preliminary figures have typically risen 1.5–2 times as more cargoes were confirmed; that is a historical pattern, not a forecast range.
In Kpler's October 19 briefing (data through Oct 17), adding Gulf of Oman ship-to-ship transfers raises the 7-day Hormuz total from 7.9M to 10.2M barrels a day, 41% below its 17.3M baseline. Tanker crossings averaged 10 a day versus 50 prewar. Of 43 crossings on Oct 14–17, Kpler classed 34 as dark or unknown-route movements; its counts include verified movements without tracking signals.
Red Sea flows include rerouted Saudi exports, not just traffic through Bab el-Mandeb. Yanbu lies north of the strait, so its exports can avoid that passage. Kpler's October 19 briefing reports an East–West pipeline operating rate of about 5.8M barrels a day on Oct 12, citing industry sources. The planned expansion from 7M to 10M barrels a day is capacity, not current flow, and could take up to three years.
The UK Maritime Trade Operations centre (UKMTO), run by the Royal Navy, collects reports from merchant ships in the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. UKMTO recorded at least 2 attack reports in each complete week shown. Oil can keep moving through these routes while ships are still being attacked.
These are reported attacks, not a count of every attack. In its Oct 16 weekly overview, UKMTO said it is struggling to establish the true number: the majority of targeted vessels refuse to report, and it is aware of incidents it cannot publish without verification (gCaptain, Oct 16; Seatrade, Oct 18). These figures may understate the actual number, and weeks near the present can shift as delayed reports arrive. Hijackings, advisories, and suspicious activity are recorded separately and aren't included here.
Source: UKMTO attack reports, Jul 1–Oct 27, 2026. Weeks run Monday–Sunday, using incident dates where available and logged dates otherwise. Lighter bars mark partial weeks; the latest week is still in progress.
This chart uses reports #78 through #183, as of Oct 27, 2026. UKMTO numbers reports for the year; 77 came before this chart's start, including three before the war began on February 28. We keep earlier entries as UKMTO's recent-incidents page moves forward. The 25 reports classified as hijackings, advisories, or suspicious activity aren't counted as attacks.
Reports #167–169 were logged on Oct 12 without event dates in their text. Maritime reporting places those attacks on Oct 11, so their assignment to a week remains uncertain.
Reports #99, #100, and #125 are missing from the captured page. The Joint Maritime Information Center's August 4 update records Egyptian authorities identifying #99 and #100 as likely drone attacks. Those two reports aren't included in the bars, and #125 remains unaccounted for. Other unreported attacks may also be missing.
Kpler reported Middle East oil flows above 24 million barrels a day in the week ending October 18, exceeding the prewar average of 23.3 million despite continued attacks. Freight and war-risk insurance remain expensive (Wall Street Journal, Oct 20).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes the US, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Korea, Australia, and much of Western Europe. This chart shows crude oil and refined fuels stored on land by companies and governments in those member countries. These stocks help make up for interruptions in supply. China isn't an OECD member, so its stockpiles aren't included.
In June 2026, the latest month shown, stocks were at their lowest in the EIA data since January 2021. The shaded band shows the range for each calendar month from 2021 through 2025. Stocks fell below that range in April, May and June 2026.
Company and government oil stocks held on land. EIA international data, monthly, January 2021–June 2026, in million barrels. Shaded range: 2021–2025. The vertical line marks the start of the war on February 28, 2026.
The chart compares IEA-reported inventories with the EIA outlook and a continuation of the recent trend. Zero marks the August 2026 stock level, not empty tanks. The agencies' figures cover different sets of stocks.
We withdrew our scenario projections on October 21; the original forecasts, assumptions, and results remain in the forecast archive.
Change since August 2026, in million barrels. Dark line: the IEA's reported global observed inventories (Oct 14, 2026 edition), through September 2026. Dashed: the EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, Oct 6, 2026 release — a September estimate plus forecasts from October. Dotted: the recent trend, repeating the June–August average monthly change (−47.7 million barrels a month). All lines combine crude oil and refined fuels. Transfers from government reserves to commercial stocks do not reduce the combined total.
These stocks exclude the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). They stood at 412.5 million barrels on Oct 16, up from 404.5 million on Jul 24. The EIA's Oct 21 report shows stocks fell by 3.1 million barrels, the third straight weekly decline. Crude imports fell by 0.3 million barrels a day that week, to 5.8 million a day. Stocks were 10.3 million barrels below the same week last year. SPR releases have helped supply commercial oil users this year. Moving oil from the reserve to commercial storage leaves the combined amount unchanged.
EIA weekly stocks, excluding the SPR, in million barrels. The Jul 24 low was 22.2M below the same week in 2025.
EIA weekly ending stocks, million bbl
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is the US government's emergency supply of crude oil. It was created after the energy shortages of the 1970s. The reserve held 415.4 million barrels when the war began. The latest report, for the week ending Oct 16, puts it at 282.7 million, down 0.3 million on the week after a flat week. Weekly withdrawals have slowed from 3.1 million barrels in the week ending Aug 28. For comparison, the reserve peaked at 727 million barrels in December 2009 and stood at 270.5 million in August 1982. The releases help make up for supplies that can't leave the Gulf.
SPR stocks were unchanged in the week ending Oct 9, after falling by about 112,000 barrels a day the week before. A flat week doesn't establish that future deliveries have stopped. DOE's September offering scheduled deliveries for November–December. On Oct 16, DOE sought bids to exchange up to 17 million barrels. This request does not confirm the earlier awards of 20–25 million barrels reported by Argus, citing sources, on Oct 13. Separately, DOE authorized hurricane-related exchanges of up to 4 million barrels on Oct 10, including accelerated deliveries under an existing award.
The red lines mark reserve reference levels, or floors. At about 300M barrels, some caverns risk damage and can't safely be refilled after a withdrawal. The first report below that threshold was for the week ending Aug 7, at 298.7 million barrels. The other floors are 250M, the GEF minimum for sustained withdrawals; 180M, the hard operating limit; and 70M, the Department of Energy's stated safe minimum.
Crude oil has to be refined before it can be used as diesel, gasoline, or jet fuel. That makes refinery capacity just as important as the amount of oil available. US refineries are processing more oil than last year, while processing has fallen elsewhere and strikes continue to damage Russian refineries. The IEA describes the global refining system as “stretched to the limit.” Atlantic Basin refining margins reached records in August, led by diesel.
Straight-run (distillation) yield, % of barrel volume
Different crude oils produce different mixes of fuels. Heavier oil needs extra processing, energy and sometimes hydrogen. Lighter oil can overwhelm some equipment while leaving other units underused. A refinery may have to pay for modifications or cut output, spreading fixed costs over fewer barrels.
These examples compare US shale, Gulf crude, and heavy sour crude (diluted bitumen) using three of the 42 lab reports, called assays, in ExxonMobil's public library. It's a small sample, chosen for availability and contrast. The bars show straight-run yields: the parts separated by heating the oil, before further processing into finished fuels. The parts used for diesel and jet fuel make up 39.2% of WTI Light – Export, 34.9% of Upper Zakum, and 18.1% of Kearl.
The heavier parts need more equipment. Most complex refineries can process vacuum gas oil, but the heaviest residue needs specialized equipment, such as a coker, to break it down. Residue makes up 31.4% of Kearl, compared with 16.5% of Upper Zakum and 4.1% of WTI. That helps explain why heavy crude from Canada or Venezuela can't quickly replace missing Gulf supplies. The next chart shows how much of each type the world produced before the war; the diesel price gap chart shows how fuel prices have diverged from crude prices.
WTI Light – Export · Light sweet (US shale), 47.4° API, 0.07% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 39.2%
butane and lighter 3.0% (gases)
Upper Zakum · Medium sour (Gulf), 33.4° API, 2.09% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 34.9%
butane and lighter 3.1% (gases)
Kearl Blend · Heavy sour (diluted bitumen), 19.8° API, 3.83% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 18.1%
butane and lighter 1.4% (gases)
First-stage yields by volume, not finished fuel output. Upper Zakum stands in for Arab Light; Kearl stands in for Venezuela's Merey; no public assays of Arab Light or Merey are in that library. These are examples, not averages for their classes. Naphtha combines light and heavy naphtha; vacuum gas oil (VGO) is the 350–550 °C portion; residue is what remains above 550 °C. Assays: WTI Light – Export, WTLEX26Y, Feb 27, 2026; Upper Zakum, UPZAK26B, Jan 23, 2026; Kearl Blend, KEARL23B, Oct 26, 2023. Dates as printed in the reports. Source: ExxonMobil's crude oil assay library. Processing requirements: EIA. Lighter-crude constraints: EIA's study of processing light shale oil.
million barrels per day · world, annual
Many refineries are built for medium-sour crude: oil with a medium density and high sulfur content. Switching to other grades can require major changes that take years. ExxonMobil's Beaumont expansion began construction in 2019 and started operating in 2023.
The chart below shows how the world's supply of different types of crude changed before the war. Medium-sour crude accounted for 32.8% of production in 2024. Its share had been falling while light, sweet crude grew from 18.7% in 2010 to 23.0% in 2024. Refiners had invested in equipment for heavier oil before the shale boom, so the growing supply of lighter crude doesn't suit every plant equally well.
The war has cut supplies of the medium-sour oil those plants were built to use. The IEA's September report put lost Gulf production at more than 10 million barrels a day (August 2026). Several of the Gulf's main export grades sit in this chart's medium-sour band (26–35° API): Arab Light (32.8°), Arab Medium (30.2°) and Basrah Medium (27.9°, Iraq's largest export grade since 2021). The IEA does not break the shut-in down by grade, so how the loss splits across the bands is not known. The production data ends in 2024; the annotation above the 2024 column shows the loss reported in 2026, across all grades.
World crude production, million barrels per day. Eni's ten quality classes are grouped into five; “other grades” combines six classes and unassigned production (0.7% in 2024). Reported years: 2010, 2015 and 2019–2024. Source: Eni, World Energy Review 2025 (21 Oct 2025), using IEA data; table on printed p96, definitions on p9 (PDF pages 98 and 11). Annotation: IEA Oil Market Report, 11 Sep 2026 (August 2026 data); it marks the total loss, not a single grade. Gulf export-grade properties: Wikipedia (Arab Light, Arab Medium) and Petro-Logistics (Basrah Medium, 27.9° API / 3.0% S, Iraq's main export grade since 2021; Basrah Light export stopped in Jan 2022). Gulf losses also include lighter grades such as Murban and heavier grades such as Arab and Basrah heavy. Refinery configuration: IEA and EIA. Beaumont construction timeline: ExxonMobil.
In July 2026, total refinery output in OECD countries was essentially unchanged from July 2025. Gasoline and diesel output fell. Jet fuel and other kerosene rose. The comparison doesn't tell us how much of the change was caused by the war.
Estimated million barrels per day · July 2026, change vs July 2025
Oil coming in
After refining
Products coming out
Share of available refinery capacity in use, weekly.
US refineries operated above 95% of their available capacity every week from Jun 5 through Sep 11, reaching 98.0% in the week ending Aug 28. In the week ending Oct 9, they used 93.5% of their capacity and processed 135,000 more barrels a day than the week before. For the January–October weeks shown, refineries used an average of 90.7% of their capacity in 2025 and 93.6% in 2026. Fuel exports also reached a record 8 million barrels per day in August, according to OPEC. US plants are working close to capacity, but shortages in Europe, Asia, and Russia continue to put pressure on fuel supplies.
EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report (WPULEUS3), weeks ending Friday. Utilization is the amount processed divided by available capacity. Both lines cover the same Jan–Oct period. Monthly crude inputs to refineries ran 15.9–17.4 million barrels/day in the January–September months (STEO Table 4a, Oct 6 release), above 2025 in every month. The fuel price gap chart in Prices shows how fuel and crude prices compare.
Refineries elsewhere are processing less oil. These figures from the IEA's monthly Oil Market Reports show the size of the decline.
Global refining, August
81.4 mb/d
summer peak, −4.2 mb/d below a year ago (OMR, Sep 11)
Refining forecast, 2026
−2.3 mb/d
IEA forecast vs 2025 — global runs 81.7 mb/d this year (OMR, Oct 14; the Sep ed had −2.6)
Q3 forecast revision
−370 kb/d
Reduction in the Q3 refining forecast (OMR, Aug 12)
Strikes on Russian refineries are reducing the amount of fuel available to other countries. The line connects reported estimates: about 75% of capacity remaining by mid-April, about 70% by Aug 29 (Moscow Times), and about 49% by Oct 4 (Ukraine's Defense Ministry). The red bar shows how much the estimates differ. The Defense Ministry says 51% was struck (Oct 4), Russian Forbes puts lost capacity at 54% (Sep 9), and the IEA estimates more than 20%. You can compare these figures with the outages and export restrictions below. The Defense Ministry's claim hasn't been independently verified.
Estimated capacity remaining, as a share of capacity before the strikes
Capacity out of service
51%
UA Defense Ministry, Oct 4 (Khmara) — up from >45% (Sep 21) and ~30% (Aug 29, Moscow Times)
Russian Forbes: 54% (Sep 9) · IEA: more than 20% · Dallas Fed: as much as 60% over summer 2026 · Kpler: refineries operating at 60% of capacity (Oct 10, FT); estimates vary month to month · the 51% claim can't be independently verified (AP)
Refineries and industrial sites struck, Oct 24–Oct 24
2 plants
Tolyattikauchuk, Tolyatti — petrochemical plant, fire reported (Oct 24) · Omsky Kauchuk, Omsk — petrochemical plant (synthetic rubber, MTBE), fire reported (Oct 24)
Ukraine named Tolyattikauchuk as a target; Russian officials confirmed industrial damage without identifying the facilities (Reuters, Oct 24). Monitoring footage reportedly shows a fire at Omsky Kauchuk; the governor confirmed a separate logistics-hub strike (Kyiv Independent, Oct 24). Both are petrochemical plants, not crude refineries. No production halt is verified. Earlier sites remain in the research log.
Major refinery outages
Ryazan partly operating
Kirishi, Russia's second-largest, ~404 kb/d, reported halted in early September (UA.NEWS, Sep 2) · Ryazan, Moscow's main supplier, ~344 kb/d: CDU-6 shut after the Oct 15 strike; three other primary units operating (Reuters, Oct 16)
Capacity figures describe the whole plants, not measured lost output. Kirishi’s current operating status has not been verified.
Gasoline shortages at gas stations
45–53%
Share of stations without AI-92 (45%) or AI-95 (53%) gasoline, mid-September (gdebenzin, via UNN, Sep 22); rationing has returned in about two-thirds of regions (Independent, Sep 22)
Gasoline prices +21% YTD (Moscow Times, Sep 14) · IEA: diesel output down about 30%, with waits of up to 40 hours (Oct 5) · Russia plans to import up to 620,000 tonnes of gasoline monthly over Oct–Dec (UNN, Oct 23)
Jet fuel now imported
military + civilian
Russia is importing Jet A-1 from South Korea and Egypt (UA military intelligence, Aug 29); no jet fuel or gasoline has left Russia by sea for two straight weeks (S&P Global CAS, Oct 1)
ISW (Sep 26): Geran drones use jet fuel; a kerosene shortage would limit their use
Russia's export restrictions leave less fuel available to other countries during the heating season. On Sep 30, Russia extended its diesel export ban for producers through Oct 31 (government decree; Moscow Times, Reuters); on Oct 10, Moscow said the ban was partially lifted with immediate effect. Novak said deliveries could rise from 300,000 tons in October to 1M in December, potentially reaching 3M tons a month in the medium term (Interfax, Oct 12). The jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, ends on Nov 30. Damaged refineries also leave Russia with less fuel for its own gas stations and military as winter approaches.
Oct 31, 2026
diesel exports by producers — ban extended through Oct 31 (government decree, Sep 30), then partially lifted Oct 10. Novak’s announced schedule is 300,000 tons in October, 500,000 in November and 1M in December (Interfax, Oct 12). US license 135 permits diesel transactions through Apr 7, 2027; the Oct 16 Graham Act waiver leaves existing sanctions in place. Neither changes Russia’s export rules. Verified diesel deliveries remain the test.
Nov 30, 2026
jet fuel exports
Jan 31, 2027
gasoline exports and diesel exports by non-producers
Russian diesel and gasoil shipments out of Black Sea ports fell to zero in the week to Sep 24 — the first time on record (S&P Global Commodities at Sea, Oct 1); a year ago those ports sent out around 200,000 tonnes a week. S&P also reported no seaborne jet-fuel or gasoline exports for two straight weeks.
Imports aren't making up the difference, even with fuel shipments on the Belarus rail route at 25 times last year's volume. The shortage also affects Kyrgyzstan, which imports more than 90% of its gasoline from Russia and has about six weeks of reserves left.
On Oct 1, Putin called a proposed trade — halting attacks on ships in the Black Sea in exchange for halting strikes on refineries — "absurd," and estimated the strikes had cost Russia about 1% of GDP. In the US, President Trump has blamed the refinery strikes for the diesel-price surge: "This isn't really a Middle Eastern problem; this is more of a Russia problem" (Fox News, Sep 27). After the strikes resumed, he called them "a disgrace" (Newsmax, Oct 15).
Higher energy costs affect more than your fuel bill. They can slow business activity, keep inflation high, and eventually make food more expensive. People and businesses also use less oil when they can no longer afford it. Economists call this demand destruction. Below, you can compare oil use with last year's levels and see the latest recession estimates, interest rates, and possible effects on food prices.
World oil and other liquid fuel use, million barrels/day. EIA STEO, Oct 6 release; January–September, 2026 vs 2025.
World oil use fell 4.7 million barrels per day below last year's level in May, a decline of about 5%. The gap narrowed to 3.9 million in July and 1.1 million in August, then widened slightly to 1.8 million in September. Using less oil helps contain prices, but it also reflects the strain on the economy.
The IEA now expects demand to fall by 2.5 million barrels per day across 2026, compared with its August estimate of 1.6 million. It expects the quarterly decline to ease from 5.3 million in Q2 to 3.4 million in Q3 and 2.0 million in Q4, followed by a 2.6 million barrel per day recovery in 2027. The losses are concentrated in fuels such as diesel and in raw materials used to make chemicals, especially in Asia. OPEC expects a different result: demand growth of 0.4 million barrels per day in 2026. That's a difference of 2.9 million between the two forecasts.
EIA STEO Table 3e, Oct 6 2026; forecast completed Oct 1. The release lists Jan–Sep as historical data, though world and regional consumption figures are estimates. They include fuel used by refineries and ships. Forecasts from Oct 2026 onward aren't shown.
Million b/d, July 2026 vs July 2025 — same table.
World
−3.9
105.6 → 101.8 mb/d
Middle East
−1.3
10.2 → 8.9 mb/d
Asia & Oceania
−1.9
37.9 → 36.0 mb/d
China
−0.8
16.4 → 15.6 mb/d · part of Asia & Oceania; using stockpiles to support consumption
Europe
−0.1
14.8 → 14.7 mb/d
United States
−0.6
21.2 → 20.6 mb/d
These estimates, published between June and October 2026, put the chance of a US recession at 13% to 50%, with different forecast windows. Goldman Sachs has kept its estimate at 15% since Jun 26, down from 30% in late March. It repeated that estimate on Sep 14. Polymarket priced its recession contract at about 34% on Oct 16. It runs through the end of 2027 and resolves on either two consecutive quarters of falling real GDP or a recession announcement by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Its window and rules differ from the forecasts above.
The Federal Reserve can cut interest rates to help a slowing economy, but inflation makes that harder when prices are still rising too quickly. September producer prices rose 6.3% from a year earlier — the largest annual increase since December 2022 — with energy prices up 10.8% for the month alone. Consumer inflation ran 3.7% in September, with core inflation at 2.6%.
On Sep 16, the Fed voted 12-to-0 to raise rates by a quarter of a percentage point, citing elevated inflation. According to the Wall Street Journal, 16 of the 18 officials projected at least one more increase this year. Higher borrowing costs add to the pressure from rising energy prices.
Fed's target rate, Sep 16
3.75–4.00%
Up 0.25 percentage points in a 12-to-0 vote · statement: 'Inflation remains elevated. … The Committee will deliver price stability.'
Odds of a rate increase, Oct 27–28
60%
Our estimate, published Sep 16 · 16 of 18 Fed officials projected another increase this year · we'll check this prediction after the October decision
September producer prices (BLS, Oct 15)
6.3% YoY
+1.3% for the month, the largest since Mar 2022 · goods +2.6% for the month — energy +10.8%, gasoline +20.3% · Aug revised to 5.6% annually
The European Central Bank says Germany and Italy could both be in a technical recession by the end of 2026 if the conflict continues.
Borrowing costs and everyday prices are both at multi-year highs. In its Sep 16 rate decision, the Fed said inflation remained high and the economy was growing at a solid pace.
10-year US Treasury yield, % · chart through Oct 26 · weekly closes (FRED) · Sep 11, Sep 14–18, Sep 21–25, Sep 28–30, Oct 1–2, Oct 5–9, Oct 13–16, Oct 19–21, Oct 23, Oct 26: Yahoo closing values · Oct 22: US Treasury daily par yield (indicative estimate, not transactions).
The 10-year Treasury yield is the rate the US government pays to borrow for a decade. It also influences mortgage and business loan rates. It has risen by about one percentage point, or 100 basis points, since before the war. Inflation and concerns about government debt are both putting pressure on rates. The national debt exceeds $40 trillion, and $8.4 trillion of Treasuries must be refinanced by year-end.
The 10-year yield closed at 4.986% on Oct 26, back below 5% — still below the war's high close of 5.311% on Oct 5. Its quarterly increase was the largest since 1994, helping push US mortgage rates above 7% (Wall Street Journal, Oct 1). On Oct 2, the G7 reserve-release announcement and a weak September jobs report cut expectations of another Fed hike.
The 2-year yield was 4.63% on Sep 11, its highest since July 2024. The 10-year breakeven inflation rate, a market indicator of expected inflation, was 2.35% on Oct 14 (FRED), near pre-war levels. With Treasury yields higher and this measure little changed, yields after expected inflation are higher too.
CPI (retail, amber) + PPI final demand (wholesale, blue) · % year-over-year · monthly (BLS) · CPI Jan – Sep; PPI Jan – Sep.
Consumer inflation rose from about 2.4% to 4.2% in three months as fuel became more expensive. It eased to 3.4% in July and August, then rose to 3.7% in September — above the 3.6% analysts expected — with gasoline prices running 34% above a year earlier (BLS, Oct 14; AP). Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, rose to 2.6% from 2.4% over the year. Core prices rose 0.3% in September, matching August’s monthly increase.
Producer prices rose 6.3% in September compared with a year earlier, the largest annual increase since December 2022. The seasonally adjusted monthly rise was 1.3%, the largest since March 2022. Goods prices rose 2.6% for the month, led by energy (+10.8%) and gasoline (+20.3%). Prices excluding food, energy and trade services rose 5.0% over the year (BLS, Oct 15). Businesses can face these higher costs before consumers see them in prices.
Natural gas is used to make ammonia, a key ingredient in nitrogen fertilizer. Higher gas and shipping costs can make food more expensive, but the effects may take more than a year to reach your grocery bill.
The timeline uses delays seen after energy prices rose in 2007–08 and 2022 to show when food prices could rise. It's a rough comparison with those periods, not a forecast of food prices.
Gulf–India tanker shipping costs
+411%
$4.34/bbl in Aug vs pre-war (Frontline)
TTF gas (Europe)
$26.7/MMBtu
JOGMEC assessed Oct 9 (published Oct 13) · up from $24.6 on Oct 2
JKM gas (Asia)
≈$26.2/MMBtu
JOGMEC assessed Oct 9 (published Oct 13) · low-$26s, up from high-$24s on Oct 2
Higher energy prices can raise freight and fertilizer costs, affect planting and harvests, and eventually raise food prices. The bars show approximate periods based on the 2007–08 and 2022 price increases. The effects on food prices can take more than a year to appear.
Upcoming reports and decisions that could change the outlook.
Any day
Whether attacks on Saudi Arabia disrupt oil supplies. The Houthis claimed a missile attack on the Ras Tanura refinery on Oct 27. Bloomberg reported that a fire near the export terminal was contained; Saudi Arabia has not confirmed the attack. The refinery's damage and the pipeline's current operating rate remain unverified here.
Watch for Aramco damage assessments, pipeline throughput and loading data, and whether Saudi Arabia requests the support Egypt authorized on Oct 26.
Any day
Whether the US and Iran resume strikes or reach an agreement. CNN reports US forces could begin operations within 96 hours of a presidential order; Trump has not made a decision. Bessent said on Oct 26 that Kharg Island loadings had stopped and Iranian production was faltering. Those are US official claims, not verified loading or production data.
Watch for renewed strikes or an agreement. Iran's seven conditions for resuming talks remain unpublished; reported preparations don't establish a strike decision.
Any day
Whether oil keeps moving through Hormuz despite attacks. In remarks reported Oct 27, Iran's armed forces chief called the strait closed to ships outside Iranian rules. That claim doesn't establish a halt in traffic. Separately, experts linked the widening UAE oil spill to the Gem No.2 (Reuters, Oct 26); authorities haven't named the tanker.
Watch for verified losses and shipments. JMIC estimated about 492 vessels waiting outside the strait on Oct 25; its estimate uses ship-position signals and excludes ships sailing without them.
Any day
Whether Russian diesel reaches buyers. The Agioi Fanendes, the first Russian diesel cargo under the US deal, loaded 40,000 metric tons at Primorsk on Oct 22 and is expected in New York around Nov 7 (Reuters/LSEG, Oct 23). US Treasury license 135 permits diesel transactions through Apr 7, 2027.
Watch for delivery and follow-on cargoes. The IEA says refinery constraints could limit how much diesel Russia can export.
Next regional talks
Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials met Iranian leaders in Tehran on Oct 26 (CNBC). They agreed to continue security talks, according to Iranian state media cited by Bloomberg. No US–Iran agreement has been reported.
Watch for concrete shipping or security commitments. A meeting alone doesn't establish a US–Iran agreement.
Oct 28
The next EIA weekly report is due Oct 28 at 10:30 a.m. Eastern, covering the week ending Oct 23. The previous report put SPR stocks at 282.7M barrels, down 0.3M; diesel and heating-oil stocks were 104.3M, 9.7% below last year. East Coast stocks were 22% lower.
Watch whether SPR withdrawals continue and diesel stocks keep recovering. Deliveries from the sixth offering are scheduled for November–December.
Oct 28
The Fed's rate decision is due Oct 28 at 2:00 p.m. Eastern. The Fed raised rates a quarter percentage point to 3.75–4.00% on Sep 16; 16 of 18 participants projected at least one more increase this year. The site's recorded forecast assigns a 60% chance of an increase at this meeting.
Watch the decision and guidance. Bond yields will also depend on how they compare with market expectations.
Nov 1
Seven OPEC+ members are due to meet online on Nov 1 (OPEC). Sources told Reuters on Oct 27 that December output targets are likely to stay unchanged; no final decision has been made.
Watch the decision and any 2027-quota statement. A steady-targets announcement doesn't establish actual output — several members already produce below their targets.
These estimates show where shortages could worsen if the crisis continues. The dates are based on published stock levels, customs data, and export-ban schedules. The timing could be a week or two earlier or later.
Each weekly EIA report (next: Oct 28)
US East Coast — US diesel and heating-oil stocks rose by 1.7M barrels to 104.3M in the week ending Oct 16, but remained 9.7% below last year. East Coast stocks were 22% below last year. The national total was equivalent to about 27 days of use at the four-week average rate of 3.9M barrels a day; that is a comparison, not a countdown to empty tanks.
Oct 31
Russia — Russia’s diesel export ban for producers runs through Oct 31, although the government announced a partial lifting on Oct 10. Novak’s delivery schedule rises from 300,000 tons in October to 1M in December (Interfax, Oct 12). US permission doesn’t lift Russia’s restrictions. The IEA’s October report says limited operating refinery capacity makes the easing unlikely to materially change global diesel supplies.
≈ late October
Europe's oil hubs — Rotterdam-area diesel stocks could fall below 8.5–9M barrels, making it harder for traders to find supplies.
Nov 10–30
Air travel — Russia's jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, is due to end Nov 30. An extension would keep those export restrictions in place.