Oil is part of everyday life, even when you don't think about it. It's refined into fuels that power cars, move goods, and help farmers grow our food. It's also used to make things like the clothes we wear.
The war with Iran disrupted oil production and shipping. Gulf exports have since recovered despite continued attacks, but moving oil remains expensive. The International Energy Agency reported declining inventories through September. Russian refinery strikes and export bans add to fuel shortages, and the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level since 1982.
The Depletion Ledger tracks oil supplies, fuel prices, and effects on people and businesses. The charts distinguish reported data from estimates and agency forecasts, with sources and dates so you can follow what's changing.
Last updated Oct 30, 2026
Brent
$114.88
Oct 29 settlement · December contract · down $0.44 · 27th close above $100
US diesel (AAA)
$6.32
Oct 30 · down three days in a row · +70% vs pre-war $3.72
US gasoline (AAA)
$4.20
Oct 30 · +50% vs Jan $2.81 (AAA)
SPR
282.6M
Oct 23 · down 0.1M on the week · down 132.9M from pre-war 415.4M · lowest since Nov 1982
US diesel & heating oil
102.8M
Oct 23 · down 1.5M in a week · 8.3% below last year · East Coast stocks 14.3% below last year
These charts show how oil, gasoline, diesel, and natural gas prices have changed. Brent is a widely used benchmark for the price of crude oil. The gasoline and diesel charts use US national averages; the natural gas charts cover Europe and Asia. The captions explain where the readings come from. We leave gaps where data is missing.
EIA weekly and AAA daily national averages
The national average has risen from $2.81 in January to $4.20, an increase of about 50%. Prices peaked at $4.50 in May. Every month since March has averaged above the levels seen before the crisis.
AAA national average · dots on selected dates
Diesel cost $3.72 on Feb 27, just before the war. It reached a record $6.53 on Sep 22. It is now $6.32 on Oct 30, down three days in a row. That's still about 70% above its pre-war price. It first passed the previous record of about $5.85, set in June 2022, on Sep 4.
TTF, $/MMBtu. Filled dots: EIA weekly futures averages. Hollow dots: assessments and market quotes, including converted euro quotes. Sep 14 uses a contract for difference (CFD), which tracks gas prices. Contracts and delivery periods differ; comparisons are approximate.
TTF is Europe’s gas benchmark. JOGMEC’s report dated Oct 26 put the Oct 23 price at $30.80 per MMBtu for November delivery, up from $28.90 a week earlier. It cited Norwegian supply disruptions, colder weather forecasts and Middle East tensions (Global LNG Hub).
EU gas storage was 74.6% full on Oct 23, below last year and the five-year average, leaving less stored gas available as winter approaches.
JKM, $/MMBtu. Filled dots: EIA weekly futures averages (Jan–Apr). Hollow dots: assessed spot prices and market quotes (May–Oct). Contracts and delivery periods differ, so comparisons are approximate.
JKM tracks liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered to Asia. JOGMEC’s report dated Oct 26 put the Oct 23 price for December delivery in the high-$31s per MMBtu, plotted here at about $31.80, up from the high-$29s a week earlier. It cited increased buying by China, South Korea and India and concerns about winter supply (Global LNG Hub).
Brent: selected observations and monthly averages. WTI: weekly FRED spot prices and recent futures closes.
On Oct 29, Brent settled at $114.88, down $0.44, and December WTI at $102.00, down $0.78 (DTNPF/CNBC). Prices eased on prospects of renewed US–Iran talks as Iran reported further tanker incidents in the strait.
Brent combines selected observations and monthly averages; gray WTI combines weekly spot prices with recent futures closes. Hollow dots mark rounded estimates. Contract changes affect comparisons on Sep 23 (WTI), Oct 1 (Brent) and Oct 20 (WTI). The Oct 20 step down combined a switch to the cheaper December contract with a price decline; it wasn't a single-contract move.
Retail fuel price minus WTI, dollars per barrel. EIA/AAA fuel prices; FRED and recent futures closes for WTI.
This chart subtracts the price of WTI crude oil from the retail price of fuel, both in dollars per barrel. The gap includes refining, transportation, and retailing costs. It helps explain why prices at the pump can keep rising even when crude gets cheaper. The diesel gap peaked at $181.8 a barrel on Sep 23 and had eased to $163.5 by Oct 30 — still nearly twice January's $89. The gasoline gap was $74.6 on Oct 30, up from about $59 in January. The gaps can narrow when crude prices rise faster than pump prices, as they did on Sep 10.
The switch to a cheaper WTI contract on Oct 20 mechanically widens these gaps. Readings without a same-day WTI price use the nearest trading day’s price within 1–3 days; missing prices aren’t estimated. The EIA's official crack spread uses wholesale fuel prices, so these values differ.
When the world uses more oil than it produces, the difference comes out of storage. These charts show the reported record of changes in stored oil since the war began and how much oil remains in the US emergency reserve.
Before the war, the world produced about 4 million more barrels of oil per day than it used. Since the war began, it has used stored oil to cover the shortfall in most months. The EIA estimates that stocks rose slightly in July. The IEA's October 14 report estimates a full-year supply loss of 5.8 million barrels per day, about 6% of the world's oil. It expects Middle East oil flows to remain below normal until 2027, though later shipping reports show a recovery.
The IEA has coordinated a release of 400 million barrels from 32 countries. Its reported inventory decline of 509 million barrels from the end of February through September includes stocks held by companies, governments, and ships. That inventory change is separate from the announced release program.
World production minus consumption, million barrels/day. EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), Table 3a, January–September 2026; forecasts aren't shown. Gulf production outages peaked at 11.2 million barrels/day in May; lower consumption and supply from elsewhere offset much of the loss. Separately, the IEA’s October 14 report estimates that observed stocks fell by 509 million barrels from the end of February through September, an average of 2.4 million barrels/day. September’s decline was 10 million barrels: stocks on land fell by 113 million, partly offset by a 103 million barrel increase in oil on water.
EIA estimates that crude oil shipments through Hormuz fell from 15.9 million barrels a day in late 2025 to 3.7 million in April–June 2026. Refined fuel shipments fell too. Crude shipments through Bab el-Mandeb rose, while traffic through the Suez Canal and Egypt's SUMED pipeline stayed near its late-2025 level.
These April–June figures are from before the Red Sea closed in July. For more recent traffic, see the Kpler 7-day averages labeled on the map at the top of the page.
Million barrels per day · Annual averages for 2023–24; quarterly averages from 2025
Sources: EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints (March 3, 2026) and Global Energy Security Data (August 12, 2026). Hollow dots mark EIA estimates: annual averages for 2023–24 and quarterly averages from 2025. Lines connect those averages. All three charts use the same scale. The 77% headline uses EIA's total for Hormuz, 21.6 to 4.9 million barrels a day; the two rounded components shown add to 4.8 in April–June. The figures cover global traffic, and a cargo can pass through more than one route. Ship tracking became less reliable around Hormuz in 2026, so those estimates may miss some traffic.
Kpler's map figures cover crude and other oil-related cargoes, excluding LNG, NGLs and Iranian-origin strait transits. Verified movements without tracking signals can be included. The pre-war baselines use March 2025–February 2026 averages with the same definitions. They differ from the EIA's periods and coverage, so the percentages aren't directly comparable. Kpler says recent preliminary figures have typically risen 1.5–2 times as more cargoes were confirmed; that is a historical pattern, not a forecast range.
In Kpler's October 19 briefing (data through Oct 17), adding Gulf of Oman ship-to-ship transfers raises the 7-day Hormuz total from 7.9M to 10.2M barrels a day, 41% below its 17.3M baseline. Tanker crossings averaged 10 a day versus 50 prewar. Of 43 crossings on Oct 14–17, Kpler classed 34 as dark or unknown-route movements; its counts include verified movements without tracking signals.
Red Sea flows include rerouted Saudi exports, not just traffic through Bab el-Mandeb. Yanbu lies north of the strait, so its exports can avoid that passage. Kpler's October 19 briefing reports an East–West pipeline operating rate of about 5.8M barrels a day on Oct 12, citing industry sources. The planned expansion from 7M to 10M barrels a day is capacity, not current flow, and could take up to three years.
The UK Maritime Trade Operations centre (UKMTO), run by the Royal Navy, collects reports from merchant ships in the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. UKMTO recorded at least 2 attack reports in each complete week shown. Oil can keep moving through these routes while ships are still being attacked.
These are reported attacks, not a count of every attack. In its Oct 16 weekly overview, UKMTO said it is struggling to establish the true number: the majority of targeted vessels refuse to report, and it is aware of incidents it cannot publish without verification (gCaptain, Oct 16; Seatrade, Oct 18). These figures may understate the actual number, and weeks near the present can shift as delayed reports arrive. Hijackings, advisories, and suspicious activity are recorded separately and aren't included here.
Source: UKMTO attack reports, Jul 1–Oct 30, 2026. Weeks run Monday–Sunday, using incident dates where available and logged dates otherwise. Lighter bars mark partial weeks; the latest week is still in progress.
This chart uses reports #78 through #187, as of Oct 30, 2026. UKMTO numbers reports for the year; 77 came before this chart's start, including three before the war began on February 28. We keep earlier entries as UKMTO's recent-incidents page moves forward. The 28 reports classified as hijackings, advisories, or suspicious activity aren't counted as attacks.
Reports #167–169 were logged on Oct 12 without event dates in their text. Maritime reporting places those attacks on Oct 11, so their assignment to a week remains uncertain.
Reports #99, #100, and #125 are missing from the captured page. The Joint Maritime Information Center's August 4 update records Egyptian authorities identifying #99 and #100 as likely drone attacks. Those two reports aren't included in the bars, and #125 remains unaccounted for. Other unreported attacks may also be missing.
Kpler reported Middle East oil flows above 24 million barrels a day in the week ending October 18, exceeding the prewar average of 23.3 million despite continued attacks. Freight and war-risk insurance remain expensive (Wall Street Journal, Oct 20).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes the US, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Korea, Australia, and much of Western Europe. This chart shows crude oil and refined fuels stored on land by companies and governments in those member countries. These stocks help make up for interruptions in supply. China isn't an OECD member, so its stockpiles aren't included.
In June 2026, the latest month shown, stocks were at their lowest in the EIA data since January 2021. The shaded band shows the range for each calendar month from 2021 through 2025. Stocks fell below that range in April, May and June 2026.
Company and government oil stocks held on land. EIA international data, monthly, January 2021–June 2026, in million barrels. Shaded range: 2021–2025. The vertical line marks the start of the war on February 28, 2026.
The chart compares IEA-reported inventories with the EIA outlook and a continuation of the recent trend. Zero marks the August 2026 stock level, not empty tanks. The agencies' figures cover different sets of stocks.
We withdrew our scenario projections on October 21; the original forecasts, assumptions, and results remain in the forecast archive.
Change since August 2026, in million barrels. Dark line: the IEA's reported global observed inventories (Oct 14, 2026 edition), through September 2026. Dashed: the EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, Oct 6, 2026 release — a September estimate plus forecasts from October. Dotted: the recent trend, repeating the June–August average monthly change (−47.7 million barrels a month). All lines combine crude oil and refined fuels. Transfers from government reserves to commercial stocks do not reduce the combined total.
Commercial crude stocks exclude the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). They fell by 1.9 million barrels to 410.6 million in the week ending Oct 23, the fourth straight decline, despite imports rising to 6.4 million barrels a day (EIA). Stocks were 5.3 million barrels below the same week last year. Moving oil from the SPR to commercial storage leaves their combined total unchanged.
EIA weekly stocks, excluding the SPR, in million barrels. The Jul 24 low was 22.2M below the same week in 2025.
EIA weekly ending stocks, million bbl
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is the US government's emergency supply of crude oil. It was created after the energy shortages of the 1970s. The reserve held 415.4 million barrels when the war began. The latest report, for the week ending Oct 23, puts it at 282.6 million, down 0.1 million on the week after a 0.3 million decline. Weekly withdrawals have slowed from 3.1 million barrels in the week ending Aug 28. For comparison, the reserve peaked at 727 million barrels in December 2009 and stood at 270.5 million in August 1982. The releases help make up for supplies that can't leave the Gulf.
SPR stocks were unchanged in the week ending Oct 9, after falling by about 112,000 barrels a day the week before. A flat week doesn't establish that future deliveries have stopped. DOE's September offering scheduled deliveries for November–December. On Oct 16, DOE sought bids to exchange up to 17 million barrels. This request does not confirm the earlier awards of 20–25 million barrels reported by Argus, citing sources, on Oct 13. Separately, DOE authorized hurricane-related exchanges of up to 4 million barrels on Oct 10, including accelerated deliveries under an existing award.
The red lines mark reserve reference levels, or floors. At about 300M barrels, some caverns risk damage and can't safely be refilled after a withdrawal. The first report below that threshold was for the week ending Aug 7, at 298.7 million barrels. The other floors are 250M, the GEF minimum for sustained withdrawals; 180M, the hard operating limit; and 70M, the Department of Energy's stated safe minimum.
Crude oil has to be refined before it can be used as diesel, gasoline, or jet fuel. That makes refinery capacity just as important as the amount of oil available. US refineries are processing more oil than last year, while processing has fallen elsewhere and strikes continue to damage Russian refineries. The IEA describes the global refining system as “stretched to the limit.” Atlantic Basin refining margins reached records in August, led by diesel.
Straight-run (distillation) yield, % of barrel volume
Different crude oils produce different mixes of fuels. Heavier oil needs extra processing, energy and sometimes hydrogen. Lighter oil can overwhelm some equipment while leaving other units underused. A refinery may have to pay for modifications or cut output, spreading fixed costs over fewer barrels.
These examples compare US shale, Gulf crude, and heavy sour crude (diluted bitumen) using three of the 42 lab reports, called assays, in ExxonMobil's public library. It's a small sample, chosen for availability and contrast. The bars show straight-run yields: the parts separated by heating the oil, before further processing into finished fuels. The parts used for diesel and jet fuel make up 39.2% of WTI Light – Export, 34.9% of Upper Zakum, and 18.1% of Kearl.
The heavier parts need more equipment. Most complex refineries can process vacuum gas oil, but the heaviest residue needs specialized equipment, such as a coker, to break it down. Residue makes up 31.4% of Kearl, compared with 16.5% of Upper Zakum and 4.1% of WTI. That helps explain why heavy crude from Canada or Venezuela can't quickly replace missing Gulf supplies. The next chart shows how much of each type the world produced before the war; the diesel price gap chart shows how fuel prices have diverged from crude prices.
WTI Light – Export · Light sweet (US shale), 47.4° API, 0.07% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 39.2%
butane and lighter 3.0% (gases)
Upper Zakum · Medium sour (Gulf), 33.4° API, 2.09% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 34.9%
butane and lighter 3.1% (gases)
Kearl Blend · Heavy sour (diluted bitumen), 19.8° API, 3.83% S
diesel + kerosene fractions: 18.1%
butane and lighter 1.4% (gases)
First-stage yields by volume, not finished fuel output. Upper Zakum stands in for Arab Light; Kearl stands in for Venezuela's Merey; no public assays of Arab Light or Merey are in that library. These are examples, not averages for their classes. Naphtha combines light and heavy naphtha; vacuum gas oil (VGO) is the 350–550 °C portion; residue is what remains above 550 °C. Assays: WTI Light – Export, WTLEX26Y, Feb 27, 2026; Upper Zakum, UPZAK26B, Jan 23, 2026; Kearl Blend, KEARL23B, Oct 26, 2023. Dates as printed in the reports. Source: ExxonMobil's crude oil assay library. Processing requirements: EIA. Lighter-crude constraints: EIA's study of processing light shale oil.
million barrels per day · world, annual
Many refineries are built for medium-sour crude: oil with a medium density and high sulfur content. Switching to other grades can require major changes that take years. ExxonMobil's Beaumont expansion began construction in 2019 and started operating in 2023.
The chart below shows how the world's supply of different types of crude changed before the war. Medium-sour crude accounted for 32.8% of production in 2024. Its share had been falling while light, sweet crude grew from 18.7% in 2010 to 23.0% in 2024. Refiners had invested in equipment for heavier oil before the shale boom, so the growing supply of lighter crude doesn't suit every plant equally well.
The war has cut supplies of the medium-sour oil those plants were built to use. The IEA's September report put lost Gulf production at more than 10 million barrels a day (August 2026). Several of the Gulf's main export grades sit in this chart's medium-sour band (26–35° API): Arab Light (32.8°), Arab Medium (30.2°) and Basrah Medium (27.9°, Iraq's largest export grade since 2021). The IEA does not break the shut-in down by grade, so how the loss splits across the bands is not known. The production data ends in 2024; the annotation above the 2024 column shows the loss reported in 2026, across all grades.
World crude production, million barrels per day. Eni's ten quality classes are grouped into five; “other grades” combines six classes and unassigned production (0.7% in 2024). Reported years: 2010, 2015 and 2019–2024. Source: Eni, World Energy Review 2025 (21 Oct 2025), using IEA data; table on printed p96, definitions on p9 (PDF pages 98 and 11). Annotation: IEA Oil Market Report, 11 Sep 2026 (August 2026 data); it marks the total loss, not a single grade. Gulf export-grade properties: Wikipedia (Arab Light, Arab Medium) and Petro-Logistics (Basrah Medium, 27.9° API / 3.0% S, Iraq's main export grade since 2021; Basrah Light export stopped in Jan 2022). Gulf losses also include lighter grades such as Murban and heavier grades such as Arab and Basrah heavy. Refinery configuration: IEA and EIA. Beaumont construction timeline: ExxonMobil.
In July 2026, total refinery output in OECD countries was essentially unchanged from July 2025. Gasoline and diesel output fell. Jet fuel and other kerosene rose. The comparison doesn't tell us how much of the change was caused by the war.
Estimated million barrels per day · July 2026, change vs July 2025
Oil coming in
After refining
Products coming out
Share of available refinery capacity in use, weekly.
US refineries used 92.8% of their available capacity in the week ending Oct 23, their sixth straight week below 95%. They processed 123,000 fewer barrels a day than the week before. Across the January–October weeks shown, utilization averaged 93.5% in 2026 and 90.5% in 2025. It peaked at 98.0% on Aug 28.
EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report (WPULEUS3), weeks ending Friday. Utilization is the amount processed divided by available capacity. Both lines cover the same Jan–Oct period. Monthly crude inputs to refineries ran 15.9–17.4 million barrels/day in the January–September months (STEO Table 4a, Oct 6 release), above 2025 in every month. The fuel price gap chart in Prices shows how fuel and crude prices compare.
Refineries elsewhere are processing less oil. These figures from the IEA's monthly Oil Market Reports show the size of the decline.
Global refining, August
81.4 mb/d
summer peak, −4.2 mb/d below a year ago (OMR, Sep 11)
Refining forecast, 2026
−2.3 mb/d
IEA forecast vs 2025 — global runs 81.7 mb/d this year (OMR, Oct 14; the Sep ed had −2.6)
Q3 forecast revision
−370 kb/d
Reduction in the Q3 refining forecast (OMR, Aug 12)
Strikes on Russian refineries are reducing the amount of fuel available to other countries. The line connects reported estimates: about 75% of capacity remaining by mid-April, about 70% by Aug 29 (Moscow Times), and about 49% by Oct 4 (Ukraine's Defense Ministry). The red bar shows how much the estimates differ. The Defense Ministry says 51% was struck (Oct 4), Russian Forbes puts lost capacity at 54% (Sep 9), and the IEA estimates more than 20%. You can compare these figures with the outages and export restrictions below. The Defense Ministry's claim hasn't been independently verified.
Estimated capacity remaining, as a share of capacity before the strikes
Capacity out of service
51%
UA Defense Ministry, Oct 4 (Khmara) — up from >45% (Sep 21) and ~30% (Aug 29, Moscow Times)
The 51% claim isn't independently verified (AP). Earlier estimates varied: Forbes 54% out (Sep 9), IEA more than 20%, and Kpler operating at 60% of capacity (Oct 10, FT). Reuters sources estimated processing recovered to about 5M barrels/day in late October, 25% above early October. These estimates don't establish a current capacity-outage percentage.
Refineries and industrial sites struck, Oct 24–Oct 30
3 plants
Tolyattikauchuk, Tolyatti — petrochemical plant, fire reported (Oct 24) · Omsky Kauchuk, Omsk — petrochemical plant (synthetic rubber, MTBE), fire reported (Oct 24) · Novokuibyshevsk, Samara region — repeat strike (struck Sep 21–22), fire reported (Oct 30)
Ukraine named Tolyattikauchuk as a target; Russian officials confirmed industrial damage without identifying the facilities (Reuters, Oct 24); both are petrochemical plants, not crude refineries. A fire was reported at Novokuibyshevsk after an Oct 30 drone attack (UNN/RBC-Ukraine). No production halt is verified. Earlier sites remain in the research log.
Major refinery outages
Ryazan partly operating
Kirishi, Russia's second-largest, ~404 kb/d, reported halted in early September (UA.NEWS, Sep 2) · Ryazan, Moscow's main supplier, ~344 kb/d: CDU-6 shut after the Oct 15 strike; three other primary units operating (Reuters, Oct 16)
Capacity figures describe the whole plants, not measured lost output. Kirishi’s current operating status has not been verified.
Gasoline shortages at gas stations
45–53%
Share of stations without AI-92 (45%) or AI-95 (53%) gasoline, mid-September (gdebenzin, via UNN, Sep 22); rationing has returned in about two-thirds of regions (Independent, Sep 22)
Gasoline prices +21% YTD (Moscow Times, Sep 14) · IEA: diesel output down about 30%, with waits of up to 40 hours (Oct 5) · Russia plans to import up to 620,000 tonnes of gasoline monthly over Oct–Dec (UNN, Oct 23)
Jet fuel now imported
military + civilian
Russia is importing Jet A-1 from South Korea and Egypt (UA military intelligence, Aug 29); no jet fuel or gasoline has left Russia by sea for two straight weeks (S&P Global CAS, Oct 1)
ISW (Sep 26): Geran drones use jet fuel; a kerosene shortage would limit their use
Russia's export restrictions leave less fuel available to other countries during the heating season. On Sep 30, Russia extended its diesel export ban for producers through Oct 31 (government decree; Moscow Times, Reuters); on Oct 10, Moscow said the ban was partially lifted with immediate effect. Novak said deliveries could rise from 300,000 tons in October to 1M in December, potentially reaching 3M tons a month in the medium term (Interfax, Oct 12). The jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, ends on Nov 30. Damaged refineries also leave Russia with less fuel for its own gas stations and military as winter approaches.
Oct 31, 2026
diesel export ban's scheduled expiry; partially lifted Oct 10. Reuters sources (Oct 29) expect an extension through year-end, with export quotas to meet Russia's US supply commitment; no decree verified. Novak's planned shipments rise from 300,000 tons in October to 1M in December (Interfax, Oct 12). Recovering output doesn't confirm delivery. US license 135 permits transactions through Apr 7, 2027; Russian export rules still apply.
Nov 30, 2026
jet fuel exports
Jan 31, 2027
gasoline exports and diesel exports by non-producers
Russian diesel and gasoil shipments out of Black Sea ports fell to zero in the week to Sep 24 — the first time on record (S&P Global Commodities at Sea, Oct 1); a year ago those ports sent out around 200,000 tonnes a week. S&P also reported no seaborne jet-fuel or gasoline exports for two straight weeks.
Imports aren't making up the difference, even with fuel shipments on the Belarus rail route at 25 times last year's volume. The shortage also affects Kyrgyzstan, which imports more than 90% of its gasoline from Russia and has about six weeks of reserves left.
On Oct 1, Putin called a proposed trade — halting attacks on ships in the Black Sea in exchange for halting strikes on refineries — "absurd," and estimated the strikes had cost Russia about 1% of GDP. In the US, President Trump has blamed the refinery strikes for the diesel-price surge: "This isn't really a Middle Eastern problem; this is more of a Russia problem" (Fox News, Sep 27). After the strikes resumed, he called them "a disgrace" (Newsmax, Oct 15).
Higher energy costs affect more than your fuel bill. They can slow business activity, keep inflation high, and eventually make food more expensive. People and businesses also use less oil when they can no longer afford it. Economists call this demand destruction. Below, you can compare oil use with last year's levels and see the latest recession estimates, interest rates, and possible effects on food prices.
World oil and other liquid fuel use, million barrels/day. EIA STEO, Oct 6 release; January–September, 2026 vs 2025.
World oil use fell 4.7 million barrels per day below last year's level in May, a decline of about 5%. The gap narrowed to 3.9 million in July and 1.1 million in August, then widened slightly to 1.8 million in September. Using less oil helps contain prices, but it also reflects the strain on the economy.
The IEA now expects demand to fall by 2.5 million barrels per day across 2026, compared with its August estimate of 1.6 million. It expects the quarterly decline to ease from 5.3 million in Q2 to 3.4 million in Q3 and 2.0 million in Q4, followed by a 2.6 million barrel per day recovery in 2027. The losses are concentrated in fuels such as diesel and in raw materials used to make chemicals, especially in Asia. OPEC expects a different result: demand growth of 0.4 million barrels per day in 2026. That's a difference of 2.9 million between the two forecasts.
EIA STEO Table 3e, Oct 6 2026; forecast completed Oct 1. The release lists Jan–Sep as historical data, though world and regional consumption figures are estimates. They include fuel used by refineries and ships. Forecasts from Oct 2026 onward aren't shown.
Million b/d, July 2026 vs July 2025 — same table.
World
−3.9
105.6 → 101.8 mb/d
Middle East
−1.3
10.2 → 8.9 mb/d
Asia & Oceania
−1.9
37.9 → 36.0 mb/d
China
−0.8
16.4 → 15.6 mb/d · part of Asia & Oceania; using stockpiles to support consumption
Europe
−0.1
14.8 → 14.7 mb/d
United States
−0.6
21.2 → 20.6 mb/d
These estimates, published between June and October 2026, put the chance of a US recession at 13% to 50%, with different forecast windows. Goldman Sachs has kept its estimate at 15% since Jun 26, down from 30% in late March. It repeated that estimate on Sep 14. Polymarket priced its recession contract at about 34% on Oct 16. It runs through the end of 2027 and resolves on either two consecutive quarters of falling real GDP or a recession announcement by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Its window and rules differ from the forecasts above.
The Federal Reserve can cut interest rates to help a slowing economy, but inflation makes that harder when prices are still rising too quickly. September producer prices rose 6.3% from a year earlier — the largest annual increase since December 2022 — with energy prices up 10.8% for the month alone. Consumer inflation ran 3.7% in September, with core inflation at 2.6%.
On Oct 28, the Fed voted 10-to-2 to hold rates at 3.75–4.00%, six weeks after its Sep 16 increase. Two members, Cook and Hammack, voted for a quarter-point increase. The statement said inflation remained elevated and that the Committee "will deliver price stability," citing geopolitical uncertainty. Higher borrowing costs add to the pressure from rising energy prices.
Fed's target rate, Oct 28
3.75–4.00%
Held in a 10-to-2 vote — two members wanted a quarter-point increase · statement: 'Inflation remains elevated. … The Committee will deliver price stability.'
Odds of an increase, Oct 27–28 (resolved)
Held
We estimated 60% odds (published Sep 16) · the Fed held · Brier score 0.36 — running average 0.2009 over four resolved forecasts
September producer prices (BLS, Oct 15)
6.3% YoY
+1.3% for the month, the largest since Mar 2022 · goods +2.6% for the month — energy +10.8%, gasoline +20.3% · Aug revised to 5.6% annually
The European Central Bank says Germany and Italy could both be in a technical recession by the end of 2026 if the conflict continues.
Borrowing costs and everyday prices are both at multi-year highs. In its Oct 28 decision, the Fed said inflation remained elevated and that it would deliver price stability.
10-year US Treasury yield, % · chart through Oct 29 · weekly closes (FRED) · Sep 11, Sep 14–18, Sep 21–25, Sep 28–30, Oct 1–2, Oct 5–9, Oct 13–16, Oct 19–21, Oct 23, Oct 26–29: Yahoo closing values · Oct 22: US Treasury daily par yield (indicative estimate, not transactions).
The 10-year Treasury yield is the rate the US government pays to borrow for a decade. It also influences mortgage and business loan rates. It has risen by about one percentage point, or 100 basis points, since before the war. Inflation and concerns about government debt are both putting pressure on rates. The national debt exceeds $40 trillion, and $8.4 trillion of Treasuries must be refinanced by year-end.
The 10-year yield closed at 4.989% on Oct 29, back below 5% — still below the war's high close of 5.311% on Oct 5. Its quarterly increase was the largest since 1994, helping push US mortgage rates above 7% (Wall Street Journal, Oct 1). On Oct 2, the G7 reserve-release announcement and a weak September jobs report cut expectations of another Fed hike.
The 2-year yield was 4.63% on Sep 11, its highest since July 2024. The 10-year breakeven inflation rate, a market indicator of expected inflation, was 2.35% on Oct 14 (FRED), near pre-war levels. With Treasury yields higher and this measure little changed, yields after expected inflation are higher too.
CPI (retail, amber) + PPI final demand (wholesale, blue) · % year-over-year · monthly (BLS) · CPI Jan – Sep; PPI Jan – Sep.
Consumer inflation rose from about 2.4% to 4.2% in three months as fuel became more expensive. It eased to 3.4% in July and August, then rose to 3.7% in September — above the 3.6% analysts expected — with gasoline prices running 34% above a year earlier (BLS, Oct 14; AP). Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, rose to 2.6% from 2.4% over the year. Core prices rose 0.3% in September, matching August’s monthly increase.
Producer prices rose 6.3% in September compared with a year earlier, the largest annual increase since December 2022. The seasonally adjusted monthly rise was 1.3%, the largest since March 2022. Goods prices rose 2.6% for the month, led by energy (+10.8%) and gasoline (+20.3%). Prices excluding food, energy and trade services rose 5.0% over the year (BLS, Oct 15). Businesses can face these higher costs before consumers see them in prices.
Natural gas is used to make ammonia, a key ingredient in nitrogen fertilizer. Higher gas and shipping costs can make food more expensive, but the effects may take more than a year to reach your grocery bill.
The timeline uses delays seen after energy prices rose in 2007–08 and 2022 to show when food prices could rise. It's a rough comparison with those periods, not a forecast of food prices.
Gulf–India tanker shipping costs
+411%
$4.34/bbl in Aug vs pre-war (Frontline)
TTF gas (Europe)
$26.7/MMBtu
JOGMEC assessed Oct 9 (published Oct 13) · up from $24.6 on Oct 2
JKM gas (Asia)
≈$26.2/MMBtu
JOGMEC assessed Oct 9 (published Oct 13) · low-$26s, up from high-$24s on Oct 2
Higher energy prices can raise freight and fertilizer costs, affect planting and harvests, and eventually raise food prices. The bars show approximate periods based on the 2007–08 and 2022 price increases. The effects on food prices can take more than a year to appear.
Upcoming reports and decisions that could change the outlook.
Any day
Whether Houthi attacks disrupt Gulf oil supplies. Yemen's military said missiles struck Aden airport on Oct 28, injuring civilians (Arab News). On Oct 29, the Saudi-led coalition reported intercepting a missile aimed at the Eastern Province. The Ras Tanura strike claim remains unverified, as do refinery damage and the pipeline's operating rate.
Watch for Aramco damage assessments, pipeline throughput and loading data, and whether Saudi Arabia requests the support Egypt authorized on Oct 26.
Any day
Whether the US and Iran reach an agreement or resume strikes. Tasnim reported that Iran received a letter from Vice President Vance and had not replied (Oct 29). The New York Times said it proposed renewed talks. Senator Chris Murphy said he was briefed on plans for post-midterm strikes (Middle East Eye).
Watch for an Iranian reply or a US strike decision. The reported preparations don't establish that Trump has ordered an attack.
Any day
Whether oil keeps moving through Hormuz despite attacks. UKMTO reported an outbound tanker hit by a projectile on Oct 29, with no injuries reported. Its updated warning describes a separate explosives attack near Khasab: an engine-room fire temporarily disabled a tanker, which resumed its voyage (SAFETY4SEA/Ship & Bunker, Oct 30).
Watch for vessel identities, damage assessments and verified shipments. Iran separately claimed four tankers hit mines; that claim remains unverified. JMIC's 101 US-assisted transits over Oct 22–24 aren't directly comparable with its broader 2025 baseline of about 138 a day.
Any day
Whether Russian diesel reaches buyers. The Agioi Fanendes, the first Russian diesel cargo under the US deal, loaded 40,000 metric tons at Primorsk on Oct 22 and is expected in New York around Nov 7 (Reuters/LSEG, Oct 23). US Treasury license 135 permits diesel transactions through Apr 7, 2027.
Watch for delivery and follow-on cargoes. Reuters sources report recovering refinery output, but potential export supply is not confirmed delivery.
Nov 1
Seven OPEC+ members are due to meet online on Nov 1 (OPEC). Sources told Reuters on Oct 27 that December output targets are likely to stay unchanged; no final decision has been made.
Watch the decision and any 2027-quota statement. A steady-targets announcement doesn't establish actual output — several members already produce below their targets.
Nov 1
Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority threatened legal action against Sinokor vessels from Nov 1 over alleged violations of its Hormuz crossing rules (FT, Oct 27).
Watch for independently verified detentions, fines or boardings. A threat or an unspecified enforcement claim doesn't establish what happened to a vessel.
Nov 4
The next EIA weekly report is due Nov 4, covering the week ending Oct 30. The Oct 28 report put SPR stocks at 282.6M barrels, down 0.1M; diesel and heating-oil stocks were 102.8M, 8.3% below last year. East Coast stocks were 14.3% lower.
Watch whether SPR withdrawals continue and diesel stocks keep falling. Deliveries from the sixth offering are scheduled for November–December.
Nov 10
October CPI is due Nov 10 at 8:30 a.m. Eastern (BLS). September's annual inflation rate was 3.7%. The Fed held rates at 3.75–4.00% on Oct 28; two members preferred a quarter-point increase.
Watch how inflation changes and what the Fed says about its December decision. A hold in October doesn't settle the next decision.
These estimates show where shortages could worsen if the crisis continues. The dates are based on published stock levels, customs data, and export-ban schedules. The timing could be a week or two earlier or later.
Each weekly EIA report (next: Nov 4)
US East Coast — US diesel and heating-oil stocks fell by 1.5M barrels to 102.8M in the week ending Oct 23, 8.3% below last year. East Coast stocks rose to 21.8M but remained 14.3% below last year. National stocks were equivalent to about 26 days of use at the four-week average of 4.0M barrels a day; this comparison isn't a countdown to empty tanks.
Oct 31
Russia — Russia’s diesel export ban for producers runs through Oct 31, although the government announced a partial lifting on Oct 10. Novak’s delivery schedule rises from 300,000 tons in October to 1M in December (Interfax, Oct 12). US permission doesn’t lift Russia’s restrictions. The IEA’s October report says limited operating refinery capacity makes the easing unlikely to materially change global diesel supplies.
≈ late October
Europe's oil hubs — Rotterdam-area diesel stocks could fall below 8.5–9M barrels, making it harder for traders to find supplies.
Nov 10–30
Air travel — Russia's jet-fuel export ban, in force since Jun 1, is due to end Nov 30. An extension would keep those export restrictions in place.